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Solving the Pandemic Vaccine Product 
Liability Problem 
Sam F. Halabi* 
The global rollout of COVID-19 vaccines is underway, and with it the inevitable 
occurrence of severe side effects that accompany, rarely, even the safest and most effective 
vaccines. Governments have invested billions of dollars in supporting research, development, 
logistics, and supply chains, as well as supporting the creation of networks of healthcare 
providers to deliver vaccines to recipients all over the world. The European Commission and 
several international organizations have established the COVAX Facility to pool resources 
in promising vaccine candidates and to subsidize their procurement by low- and middle-income 
countries. Yet up-front investment in vaccine development and delivery solves only half the 
problem with respect to vaccine access. Risks of legal liabilities, particularly product liability 
for severe side effects, will serve as an important, if not decisive, factor in how vaccine 
manufacturers participate in the response with Emergency Use Authorized and  
recently-licensed COVID-19 vaccines. If manufacturers do not receive sufficient assurance 
against legal liability, especially product liability, they will not ship vaccines. There is limited 
experience with developing coronavirus vaccines, and severe side effects following immunization 
are inevitable, as evidenced from Phase III trials and strongly suggested by early 
administration of Emergency Use Authorized vaccines. Therefore, there is a critical need to 
balance the risk calculations of manufacturers with justice for immunization recipients who 
become seriously ill or die in order to contribute to herd immunity in the community. This 
Article outlines the components of a global no-fault liability, indemnification, and 
compensation system that includes leveraging current no-fault systems in thirty-nine countries, 
a World Health Organization insurance mechanism, and a combination of insurance and 
compensation fund construction based on claims-processing precedents from the Deepwater 
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Horizon Oil Spill and Boeing 737 Max crashes—both of which had tens of thousands of 
claims originating from dozens of countries and processed in at least six languages. The 
proposed system will be essential for vaccine manufacturer response and to address vaccine 
hesitancy and injury in populations across the globe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world’s greatest mass vaccination campaign is underway.1 Since the first 
COVID-19 vaccines were authorized in the United Kingdom, approximately  
hundreds of millions of doses have been administered, with billions more planned.2 
Vaccines are the most important public health intervention to prevent the spread 
of infectious disease, and, as a result, the whole world is racing to deploy a safe and 
effective vaccine against COVID-19.3 As of August 15, 2021, there are 179 vaccine 
candidates in pre-clinical and clinical development, thirty-three of which are in 
Phase III trials.4 As of February 27, 2021, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) had granted Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for Moderna/NIH’s, 
Pfizer/BioNTech’s, and Johnson & Johnson’s vaccines.5 Pfizer/BioNTech’s was 
given full licensure on August 23, 2021. The United Kingdom’s Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has approved those vaccines plus 
AstraZeneca’s candidate for full licensure.6 Additional vaccine candidates from 
 
1. German Lopez, The Covid-19 Vaccine’s 2 Big Challenges, VOX (Dec. 14, 2020, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22161047/covid-19-coronavirus-vaccine-manufacturing-distribution 
-persuasion [https://perma.cc/Q2XJ-XYSY] (“This is going to be the largest mass vaccination 
campaign that the US has ever attempted.”). 
2. Tom Randall, Cedric Sam, Andre Tartar, Paul Murray & Christopher Cannon, More than 4.13 
Billion Shots Given: Covid-19 Tracker, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-
vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20210802000047/https://www. 
bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/ ] (Aug 1, 2021, 2:53 PM). 
3. Press Release, World Health Org., More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine 
Global Access Facility ( July 15, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/15-07-2020-more-
than-150-countries-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-access-facility [https://perma.cc/F6FM-
8TDK]. See generally Sam F. Halabi & Saad B. Omer, Evidence, Strategies, and Challenges for Assuring 
Vaccine Availability, Efficacy, and Safety, in GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AFTER 
EBOLA 223 (Sam F. Halabi, Lawrence O. Gostin & Jeffrey S. Crowley eds., 2016). 
4. Trefis Team, What to Expect as Moderna’s COVID-19 Vaccine Moves to Phase 3 Trials, 
FORBES ( July 29, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/07/29/
what-to-expect-as-modernas-covid-19-vaccine-moves-to-phase-3-trials/?sh=7c049f761e96 [https:// 
perma.cc/CT5M-GZ9F] (“These trials will determine if the vaccine protects against Covid-19 and 
whether it will be cleared for use in the general public. Patients who recover from Covid-19 generate 
antibodies that help to prevent re-infection and per interim data from its phase 1 trials that involved 45 
people, Moderna said that the people inoculated with the vaccine generated antibodies that were 4x 
compared to people who’d recovered from Covid. The phase 3 trial will help to validate this at a larger 
scale and is expected to enroll 30,000 participants in the U.S.”); Carl Zimmer, Jonathan Corum  
& Sui-Lee Wee, Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/PNS7-AXUK] (Aug. 2, 2021). 
5. Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Submit Emergency Use Authorization 
Request Today to the U.S. FDA for Covid-19 Vaccine, (Nov. 20, 2020, 6:45AM), https://
www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-submit-emergency-use 
-authorization [https://perma.cc/XLT4-F87R]; Press Release, Moderna, Moderna Announces 
Primary Efficacy Analysis in Phase 3 COVE Study for Its COVID-19 Vaccine Candidate and Filing 
Today with U.S. FDA for Emergency Use Authorization (Nov. 30, 2020), https://
investors.modernatx.com/node/10421/pdf [https://perma.cc/65AC-RCPY]. 
6. Michael Mezher, MHRA Authorizes Pfizer-BioNTech COVID Vaccines as FDA, EMA Set 
more Conservative Timeline, REGUL. AFFS. PROS. SOC’Y (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.raps.org/news-
and-articles/news-articles/2020/12/mhra-authorizes-pfizer-biontech-covid-vaccine-as-f [http://web. 
archive.org/web/20201212100540/https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2020/12/ 
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Novavax and others are entering regulatory review for EUA. The World Health 
Organization has granted emergency use listing to those vaccines in addition to 
Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines.7 
Wealthy governments have already invested billions of dollars in the effort to 
bring more vaccine candidates to licensure, or at least EUA.8 Many countries are 
attempting to secure access to vaccines by offering funding to scale-up 
manufacturing and assisting with clinical trials.9 The Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunizations (GAVI), an international vaccine procurement consortium 
aiding low-income countries, is pursuing a similar strategy for securing equitable 
access to COVID-19 vaccines.10 The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations (CEPI), an international financing partnership, has supported at least 
ten candidates, including Moderna’s.11 Instead of waiting until after vaccines are 
approved and then bidding for them, GAVI, CEPI, the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and the European Commission, as well as a number of global health 
charities, have developed the “COVAX Facility,” an international organization 
aimed at procuring vaccine doses for all its participating governments, including 
subsidies for the purchase of vaccines by low- and middle-income countries.12 
Governments have entered into bilateral arrangements to lay claim to early 
production. For example, AstraZeneca has received payments from the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), the United States, and the Serum Institute of India, and in return 
has promised delivery of 100 million doses, delivery of 300 million doses, and 
 
mhra-authorizes-pfizer-biontech-covid-vaccine-as-f ]; Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine,  
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/
coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine [http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20210723073821/https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-
2019-covid-19/pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine ] ( last visited July 23, 2021). 
7.  Status of COVID-19 Vaccines within WHO EUL/PQ evaluation process, World Health 
Org. (Sept. 29, 2021), https://extranet.who.int/pqweb/sites/default/files/documents/Status_ 
COVID_VAX_29Sept2021_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/73YJ-2VDW].  
8. See generally Matthew Herper, AstraZeneca Lays Out Plan for Producing 2 Billion Doses of 




10. Press Release, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Gavi Launches Innovative Financing Mechanism 
for Access to COVID-19 Vaccines ( June 4, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-
launches-innovative-financing-mechanism-access-covid-19-vaccines [https://perma.cc/ZY9T-9FNB]. 
11. Press Release, World Health Org., COVAX Announces Additional Deals to Access 
Promising COVID-19 Vaccine Candidates; Plans Global Rollout Starting Q1 2021 (Dec. 18, 2020) 
[hereinafter WHO, COVAX Announces Additional Deals], https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12-
2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-access-promising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global 
-rollout-starting-q1-2021 [https://perma.cc/M6FM-KPXX]. 
12. Id.; Press Release, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Up to 100 Million COVID-19 Vaccine Doses 
to Be Made Available for Low- and Middle-Income Countries as Early as 2021 (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/100-million-covid-19-vaccine-doses-available-low-and-middle 
-income-countries-2021 [https://perma.cc/Q4CH-RFMA]. 
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assistance in producing 1 billion doses, respectively.13 However, there are far fewer 
details on what happens after the doses arrive.14 
While ex ante investment in the development of vaccines, manufacturing 
capacity, and related material like vials and syringes is critical, so too is the ex post 
consideration of what happens should emergency-authorized or fully licensed 
vaccines cause significant side effects. Most of the leading COVID-19 vaccine 
candidates are based on technologies unlicensed anywhere in the world, and the 
potential for sizable product liability claims is significant.15 On December 8, 2020, 
the first day of the U.K. vaccination campaign, two severe allergic reactions caused 
the U.K. government to require monitoring patients for fifteen minutes after each 
injection.16 In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) has detected twenty-one anaphylactic reactions to COVID-19 vaccines out 
of nearly 1.9 million doses administered, a rate of approximately 11.1 severe reaction 
 
13. Herper, supra note 8. 
14. Eileen Drage O’Reilly, The Coming Clash Over the First Coronavirus Vaccines, AXIOS  
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-vaccine-supplies-availability-16264fa9-ccd5-
4705-abd5-6d208e864ba9.html [https://perma.cc/V7ZD-2Q6H] (“There will not be enough vaccines 
to meet initial demand, experts say. That’s left nations racing to secure future supplies and international 
organizations scrambling to make sure there is equitable access to any vaccines for the novel 
coronavirus. . . . The COVID-19 vaccine race is underway, with at least 92 in development and more 
expected. They’re based on different approaches that have different manufacturing processes. There 
are a limited number of facilities that are large enough for massive scale-ups and/or are flexible enough 
to switch to a different type of vaccine than they were originally intended to produce. Over the next 
several months, there’s expected to be a ‘winnowing’ of these potential vaccines as data from initial 
trials are collected, but it will take time before it’s known which vaccine(s) are best, according to a group 
of experts at a press briefing hosted by the nonprofit ONE on Thursday. Having a global dialogue 
now on how vaccines should be scaled up and distributed is key, experts say.”); Costas Paris & Jared  
S. Hopkins, Pfizer Sets Up Its ‘Biggest Ever’ Vaccination Distribution Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2020, 6:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-sets-up-its-biggest-ever-vaccination-
distribution-campaign-11603272614 [https://perma.cc/DJF5-TC5Q] (“[T]he biggest complications 
in distribution likely would come closer to the final point of delivery rather than the first stages of 
shipping.”); Jared S. Hopkins, Covid-19 Vaccines to Be Stored Secretly Under Tight Security, WALL  
ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-vaccines-to-be-stored-
secretly-under-tight-security-11603278002?mod=hp_lead_pos4 [https://perma.cc/6ULY-S4BC] 
(detailing the complications of vaccine theft and possible precautions that will be taken to hopefully 
protect the COVID-19 vaccine from theft). 
15. John Parkinson, FDA Fast Tracks 2 COVID-19 Vaccines, CONTAGIONLIVE ( July 13, 
2020), https://www.contagionlive.com/view/fda-fast-tracks-2-covid19-vaccines [https://perma.cc/ 
A4KW-NXM8]. 
16. Joanna Sugden, Rollout of Pfizer-BioNTech Covid-19 Vaccine Slows in U.K. Due to  
Allergic-Reaction Monitoring, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2020, 12 46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
rollout-of-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine-slows-in-u-k-due-to-allergic-reaction-monitoring-116079 
67990 [https://perma.cc/VHU5-VMPK]. 
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cases per million.17 AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson vaccines have been 
associated with rare blood-clotting disorders.18 
Although the United States has granted immunity to COVID-19 vaccine 
manufacturers pursuant to its Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act 
(PREP Act),19 and manufacturers are securing “protection from future product 
liability claims” where possible on a bilateral basis, there remains no comprehensive 
plan for the potentially massive claims related to product liability.20 
For one or more vaccines likely to be distributed worldwide, there is inevitable 
risk of serious adverse events. For the H1N1 pandemic vaccine, the only vaccine 
distributed pursuant to a declared pandemic, serious adverse events following 
immunization varied widely. Among those reported in the United States through its 
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, the H1N1 pandemic vaccine produced 
a serious adverse event rate of 2.45 per 100,000.21 In the People’s Republic of China, 
the National Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) Surveillance System 
reported that a 
total of 6552 of the 8067 adverse events there (81.2%; rate, 73.1 per 1 
million doses) were verified as vaccine reactions; 1083 of the 8067 (13.4%; 
rate, 12.1 per 1 million doses) were rare and more serious (vs. common, 
minor events), most of which (1050) were allergic reactions. Eleven cases 
of the Guillain–Barré syndrome were reported, for a rate of 0.1 per 1 
million doses.22 
 
17.  Tom Shimabukuro, Allergic Reactions Including Anaphylaxis After Receipt of the First Dose 
of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine — United States, December 14–23, 2020, 70 MORBIDITY  
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 46, 46–51 ( 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/pdfs/ 
mm7002e1-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6GN-GWYM]. 
18. EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, TECHNICAL REPORT, OVERVIEW OF 
EU/EEA COUNTRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON COVID-19 VACCINATION WITH VAXZEVRIA, AND A 
SCOPING REVIEW OF EVIDENCE TO GUIDE DECISION-MAKING 1 (2021), https:// 
www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Overview%20EU%20EEA%20country%20reco
mmendations%20on%20COVID-19%20vaccination%20Vaxzevria%20and%20scoping%20review% 
20of%20evidence.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3AC-3KBE]; Press Release, U.S. FDA, FDA and CDC Lift 
Recommended Pause on Johnson & Johnson ( Janssen) COVID-19 Vaccine Use Following Thorough 
Safety Review (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-and-cdc-
lift-recommended-pause-johnson-johnson-janssen-covid-19-vaccine-use-following-thorough [https:// 
perma.cc/F892-N537]. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.  
20. Ludwig Burger & Pushkala Aripaka, AstraZeneca to be Exempt from Coronavirus Vaccine 
Liability Claims in Most Countries, REUTERS ( July 30, 2020, 6:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-astrazeneca-results-vaccine-liability/astrazeneca-to-be-exempt-from-coronavirus-vaccine 
-liability-claims-in-most-countries-idUSKCN24V2EN [https://perma.cc/5L9F-QP3F]. 
21. Barbara H. Bardenheier, Susan K. Duderstadt, Renata J.M. Engler & Michael M. McNeil, 
Adverse Events Following Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent and Seasonal Influenza 
Vaccinations During the 2009-2010 Season in the Active Component U.S. Military and Civilians Aged 
17-44 Years Reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, 34 VACCINE 4406, 4408 (2016). 
22. Xiao-Feng Liang, Da-Wei Liu, Wen-Di Wu, Bao-Ping Zhu, Hua-Qing Wang, Hui-Ming 
Luo, Ling-Sheng Cao, Jing-Shan Zheng, Da-Peng Yin, Lei Cao, Bing-Bing Wu, Hong-Hong Bao,  
Di-Sha Xu, Wei-Zhong Yang & Yu Wang, Safety of Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccine in Postmarketing 
Surveillance in China, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 638, 638 (2011). 
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Compensation costs similarly varied.23 One specific H1N1 pandemic vaccine 
that contained an adjuvant was associated with an increased risk of narcolepsy, 
resulting in significant compensation claims in Northern European countries.24 
Solving the vaccine injury problem is crucial not only for populations injured 
by serious adverse events following immunization but also for the companies that 
may not participate in the response at all if not given sufficient assurances of 
immunity or indemnity and for governments with populations that may be 
disadvantaged because their internal legal systems do not allow the immunities or 
indemnities to be arranged through bilateral contracts (i.e., there must be a 
legislative measure undertaken). This Article outlines the components of a global 
system, leveraging currently existing no-fault vaccine injury compensation systems 
in thirty-nine countries, private-sector insurance alternatives based on a proposed 
program at the WHO, and a centralized mass claims system based on models for 
compensation from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Boeing 737 Max 
airplane crashes, both of which involved hundreds or thousands of claimants from 
dozens of countries. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the legal landscape for vaccine regulation 
including premarketing review by regulatory agencies and postmarketing regulation 
through product liability claims. Part I also uses specific aspects of COVID-19 
vaccine technology and recent mass vaccination episodes to contextualize the scale 
of potential liability as well as the potentially significant lifelong costs imposed on 
those suffering rare but serious side effects after immunization. Part II introduces 
and details the COVAX Facility, an international partnership that aims to procure 
vaccine doses for low- and lower-middle-income countries unable to afford them. 
However, the COVAX Facility has not addressed the COVID-19 vaccine product 
liability problem, which is likely to thwart the vaccine’s effectiveness. Part III 
provides a three-part plan for no-fault vaccine injury compensation based on 
leveraging existing, national no-fault systems; small-scale insurance regimes; and 
mass claims models based on human-caused disasters. 
 
23. Id. 
24. Ian Sample, Ministers Lose Fight to Stop Payouts Over Swine Flu Jab Narcolepsy Cases, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/09/ministers-
lose-fight-to-stop-payouts-in-swine-flu-jab-narcolepsy-cases [https://perma.cc/D3MP-5PGF]; Rory 
Carroll, Swine Flu Vaccine Case Settled but Hopes for Legal Precedent Dashed, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 
2020, 08:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/20/swine-flu-vaccine-case-
settled-but-hopes-for-legal-precedent-dashed [https://perma.cc/4Z9Y-FQA3]. 
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I. COVID-19 VACCINES AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A. The Uniqueness of Vaccines as Regulated Medical Products 
1. Premarket Review 
Legally and medically, vaccines are sui generis. Despite their immense value in 
terms of lives saved and resources preserved—between 1980 and 2018, the WHO 
estimates vaccines have saved 150 to 200 million lives and avoided $586 billion in 
costs of illness—they are medicines given to otherwise healthy people to prevent 
disease.25 Like all medicines, vaccines carry risks of side effects, from the minor and 
common (like soreness at the injection site) to the severe and rare, such as allergic 
reactions and Guillain-Barré syndrome (a condition in which the body’s immune 
system attacks peripheral nerves), that may result in disability or death.26 
The potential for vaccines to cause harm in otherwise healthy people is the 
reason that most countries and international organizations look to scientific review 
agencies to verify the soundness of animal and human testing data, quality control 
of manufacturing facilities, and clarity of product information provided with the 
immunization. The U.S. FDA and the European Medicines Agency are two of the 
most important of these review agencies, and they provide services not only for the 
populations under their territorial authority but also for international organizations 
that procure vaccines for countries without the ability to undertake their own 
regulatory review.27 
The FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research is responsible for 
regulating vaccines in the United States, and its approval facilitates the use of 
 
25. Samantha Vanderslott, Bernadeta Dadonaite & Max Roser, Vaccination, OUR WORLD IN 
DATA n.3 (2015) (“UNICEF (1996) and Hinman, A. R. (1998) estimate that in the absence of a vaccine 
the world would have seen 5 million deaths due to smallpox every year in the mid-1990s. Assuming 
that the estimate for the mid-1990s provides a midpoint estimate for the period since 1980 and therefore 
multiplying the 5 million per year estimate by the number of years between 1980 and 2016 means that 
since the eradication of the disease 190 million people’s lives were saved. UNICEF (1996) – Vaccines 
bring 7 diseases under control.”). See generally Sachiko Ozawa, Samantha Clark, Allison Portnoy, Simrun 
Grewal, Logan Brenzel & Damian G. Walker, Return on Investment From Childhood Immunization in 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2011-20, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 199 (2016); Anya E.R. Prince, Prevention 
for Those Who Can Pay: Insurance Reimbursement of Genetic-Based Preventative Interventions in the Liminal 
State Between Health and Disease, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 365, 369 (2015) (“Public health literature 
references prevention by type—primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention occurs before a 
disease manifests through symptoms or biological changes. A common example is vaccination to 
protect against certain infectious childhood diseases. Whereas primary prevention reduces both 
incidence and prevalence of a condition because it blocks an individual from getting a disease, secondary 
prevention occurs after biological changes have arisen in an individual but reduces disease severity by 
preventing progression or mortality.”). 
26. Sam F. Halabi & Saad B. Omer, A Global Vaccine Injury Compensation System, 317 JAMA 
471, 471 (2017); Richard A.C. Hughes & David R. Cornblath, Guillain-Barré Syndrome, 366 LANCET 
1653, 1653 (2005). 
27. See generally Sam Halabi & John Monahan, Regulatory Capacity in Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries: Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, in FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN AN ERA 
OF GLOBALIZED MARKETS 63 (Sam Halabi ed., 2015). 
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vaccines in countries that lack regulatory capacity.28 The vaccine clinical 
development process—including that of COVID-19 vaccines—follows the same 
general pathway as for drugs and other biologics.29 
As researchers identify and isolate the relevant pathogen, they seek to 
understand, to the greatest extent possible, the biological mechanism or 
mechanisms that lead to disease.30 While some candidate vaccines occur naturally 
(like that for smallpox), most candidates are developed using empirical  
approaches: historically, serial propagation of a pathogen through media that 
diminishes pathogenicity, or that is killed or dissected after cultivation and used in 
relatively large doses, with adjuvants or in multiple doses to prompt an immune 
response.31 More recent techniques like “reverse vaccinology” start from genomic 
sequences and, by computer simulation, predict those antigens that are most likely 
to be vaccine candidates.32 Vaccine candidates are then tested in animals after 
developing models for immunogenicity and safety.33 
After animal testing, the vaccine sponsor applies for Investigational New Drug 
(IND) status from the U.S. FDA, which authorizes the sponsor to undertake clinical 
trials on humans for safety and efficacy and, ultimately, to build the evidentiary case 
for licensure.34 The first of these trials (Phase I) is designed to assess the safety, 
immunogenicity, and dose-response of the vaccine in, typically, 20–100 healthy 
volunteers.35 The IND describes the vaccine, its method of manufacture and quality 
control tests for release, information about the vaccine’s safety and ability to prompt 
a protective immune response in animal testing, and the proposed clinical  
studies protocol.36 
In Phase II, the sample size is increased to several hundred healthy volunteers, 
and investigators focus on safety as well as immunogenicity. In Phase II(b)  
“proof-of-concept” studies, dose-ranges and vaccine components are confirmed 
 
28. Vaccine Development – 101, U.S. FDA, https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/
development-approval-process-cber/vaccine-development-101 [https://perma.cc/HUD8-DBS9] 
(Dec. 14, 2020). 
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (outlining the regulation of biological products). 
30. See generally PRINCIPLES OF BACTERIAL PATHOGENESIS (Eduardo A. Groisman ed., 2001). 
31. Nicola P. Klein, Joan Bartlett, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Bruce Fireman & Roger Baxter, Waning 
Protection After Fifth Dose of Acellular Pertussis Vaccine in Children, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 
(2012); Bo Ma, Li-Fang He, Yi-Li Zhang, Min Chen, Li-Li Wang, Hong-Wei Yang, Ting Yan,  
Meng-Xiang Sun & Cong-Yi Zheng, Characteristics and Viral Propagation Properties of a New Human 
Diploid Cell Line, Walvax-2, and Its Suitability as a Candidate Cell Substrate for Vaccine Production, 11 
HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAUPETICS 998, 1004–05 (2015). 
32. Rino Rappuoli, Reverse Vaccinology, a Genome-Based Approach to Vaccine Development, 19 
VACCINE 2688, 2689 (2001). 
33. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
34. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2020). 
35. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
36. U.S. FDA, INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUG (IND) APPLICATION, https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drug-ind-application [https://perma.cc/L9TJ-RQ6Y] 
(Feb. 24, 2021). 
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before moving to much larger Phase III studies.37 Phase III vaccine trials enroll up 
to thousands or tens of thousands of human subjects in order to detect rare adverse 
events.38 In 1998, for example, a rotavirus vaccine was licensed for use in the United 
States after Phase III trials on approximately 10,000 infants showed safety and 
efficacy. However, when administered to a larger population, physicians and 
researchers observed an association between the vaccine and bowel obstruction, 
resulting in the withdrawal of the vaccine.39 If larger Phase III studies confirm safety 
and efficacy, the vaccine is approved for marketing after the FDA’s review of  
study data.40 
Safety evaluations are essential during each phase of the clinic trials and 
continue after the approval of the vaccine. It is especially important to develop a 
systematic approach to classifying side effects to be able to assess causality when a 
side effect is observed in the clinical trial.41 Until a vaccine is given to the general 
population, not all potential adverse reactions can be anticipated.42 Thus, many 
vaccines undergo Phase IV: postmarketing surveillance and strict safety reporting 
standards during and after clinical trials.43 A key criterion during Phase IV studies is 
to determine if there was a “reasonable possibility that the drug (or biologic) caused 
[an adverse] event and whether the event (or pattern of events) [was] unexpected.”44 
Vaccine approval also requires adequate product labeling to allow health-care 
providers to understand the vaccine’s proper use (including its potential benefits 
and risks), to communicate with patients and parents, and to safely deliver the 
vaccine to the public.45 A product’s package insert, also known as the “label,” is a 
critical element of the evaluation of a vaccination.46 
2. Tort Liability as a Regulatory Mechanism 
Under the laws of most countries, regulatory review of medical products does 
not generally preclude the liability for manufacturers of those products for injuries 
 
37. See Bernd Schmidt, Proof of Principle Studies, 68 EPILEPSY RES. 49, 49 (2006). 
38. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
39. Brian R. Murphy, David M. Morens, Lone Simonsen, Robert M. Chanock, John R. La 
Montagne & Albert Z. Kapikian, Reappraisal of the Association of Intussusception with the Licensed Live 
Rotavirus Vaccine Challenges Initial Conclusions, 187 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1301, 1301 (2003). 
40. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
41. Jeffrey N. Roberts & Marion F. Gruber, Regulatory Considerations in the Clinical Development 
of Vaccines Indicated for Use During Pregnancy, 33 VACCINE 966, 969 (2015); see Alberto E. Tozzi, 
Edwin J. Asturias, Madhava Ram Balakrishnan, Neal A. Halsey, Barbara Law & Patrick L.F. Zuber, 
Assessment of Causality of Individual Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI): A WHO Tool for 
Global Use, 31 VACCINE 5041, 5041 (2013) (detailing a study commissioned to review the WHO’s 
“Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI) causality assessment methodology and aid-memoire, 
and to develop a standardized and user friendly tool to assist health care personnel in the process and 
interpretation of data on induvial, and to assess the causality after AEFIs”). 
42. See generally Tozzi et al., supra note 41; Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
43. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
44. Roberts & Gruber, supra note 41, at 969. 
45. Vaccine Development – 101, supra note 28. 
46. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56–.57 (2020). 
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attributable to them. In EU member states, laws generally place liability for vaccine 
side effects on pharmaceutical companies.47 Over the course of the H1N1 
pandemic, it was discovered that legal liabilities across the world, by default, 
remained with manufacturers for the pandemic vaccine’s side effects, a matter that 
resulted in significant delays as countries, the WHO, and manufacturers negotiated 
over indemnity provisions.48 
Within the United States, vaccine side effects were (before 1986) generally 
susceptible to state law claims made under principles of strict liability as well as tort 
regimes specific to “unavoidably unsafe” products, which require only that 
producers of medicines and vaccines properly prepare and market them and supply 
sufficient warnings about their use.49 The general idea for maintaining the possibility 
of liability for side effects is that it supplies an incentive for manufacturers to 
continually invest in the safety of their products and that, between an uninjured (and 
presumptively compensated) manufacturer and an injured vaccine recipient, the law 
should favor making the injured person whole.50 After the adoption of the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, vaccine side effects are now almost entirely 
routed to a no-fault compensation system administered through the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims.51 
Worldwide, the law of product liability generally imposes three kinds of 
obligations on vaccine manufacturers: to ensure that they manufacture vaccines 
consistently with current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs); that they design 
their vaccines so severe side effects are minimized to the greatest extent possible 
without compromising their cost and utility; and that they properly label vaccines, 
including the risks and benefits of administration.52 In U.S. legal nomenclature, 
these obligations are generally understood to give vaccine recipients the right to 
receive vaccines free from manufacturing defects, design defects, and labeling 
 
47. Francesco Guarascio, Limited Legal Protection for COVID Vaccine Makers Hampers EU 
Deals, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2020, 1:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
eu-vaccines/limited-legal-protection-for-covid-vaccine-makers-hampers-eu-deals-idUSKBN25M0RQ 
[https://perma.cc/AE4Y-TDC3]. 
48. Sam F. Halabi, Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability: The Complex Contracting 
Relationship Between Vaccine Manufacturers, the World Health Organization, Donor and Beneficiary 
Governments, in THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO 2009 H1N1: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 203, 207 
(Michael A. Stoto & Melissa A. Higdon eds., 2015). 
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402, 402A cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
50. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 250 (2011) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
51. Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, https://
www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters [https://perma.cc/KCN7-SA43] 
( last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
52. Sam Halabi & John Monahan, Sharing the Burden of Ebola Vaccine-Related Adverse Events, 
24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 136 (2015); see also John C. Reitz, Doubts About Convergence: Political 
Economy as an Impediment to Globalization, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140 (“Since 
virtually all modern legal systems in the world are modeled to a substantial degree on aspects of either 
the common or the civil law or both, especially with regard to their commercial law and some of their 
public law, the convergence thesis seems relevant to all countries in the world.”); Bruesewitz, 562  
U.S. at 250 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
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defects (labeling defects include “failures to warn” of relevant risks, benefits, and 
other relevant information).53 This latter right enjoyed by vaccine recipients 
overlaps to some degree, although not completely, with principles of  
informed consent.54 
This Article focuses specifically on the possibility that legal action will be taken 
because of a manufacturer’s actions, inactions, products, services, or other activities, 
leading to claims based on: (1) product liability (including perception and attribution 
of injury) and (2) informed consent/product labeling. 
B. Product Liability and COVID-19 Vaccines 
1. Real and Unknown Risks 
Even safe and effective vaccines generate adverse events among those 
inoculated, ranging from (common) soreness at the injection site, fever, discomfort, 
and muscle pain to (rare) anaphylaxis and other severe reactions.55 For vaccines 
incorporating traditional platforms—like an inactivated virus (i.e., a killed virus, 
commonly used for flu shots) or live-attenuated virus (i.e., a virus that has been 
weakened under laboratory conditions, used for measles, mumps, and rubella 
(MMR))—there are decades of evidence and well-controlled postimmunization 
surveillance to confirm both safety and efficacy.56 The occurrence of serious side 
effects, such as those that result in death, threaten life, require inpatient 
hospitalization, or result in significant disability, are rare (e.g., less than one adverse 
event occurs per ten million doses for tetanus toxoid vaccines, one to two adverse 
events per one million doses for inactivated influenza vaccine, and none for 
hepatitis A).57 
a. New Vaccine Technologies 
Robust data sets are essential to better define risk to specific subgroups, 
clearly demonstrate clinical benefit, better define and continue to evaluate as part 
of an ongoing process the safety profile of the vaccine, and facilitate 
 
53. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984) (student ed.). 
54. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to “Patient Has 
Rights”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2001) (“Today, the right of a patient to participate to some 
extent in medical decision making affecting the patient is universally dictated by the ‘informed consent’ 
laws of all states.”). 
55. Luana Raposo de Melo Moraes Aps, Marco Aurélio Floriano Piantola, Sara Araujo Pereira, 
Julia Tavares de Castro, Fernanda Ayane de Oliveira Santos & Luís Carlos de Souza Ferreira, Adverse 
Events of Vaccines and the Consequences of Non-Vaccination: A Critical Review, 52 REVISTA DE SAÚDE 
PÚBLICA 1, 3 (2018) (“The administration of these compounds may lead to adverse reactions, such as 
local inflammatory reactions and, much less frequently, systemic effects, such as the exacerbation of 
autoimmune diseases and allergies.”). 
56. See generally Stanley Plotkin, History of Vaccination, 111 PNAS 12283 (2014). 
57. Halabi & Omer, supra note 26, at 471. 
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communication of benefit/risk data and information that will mitigate litigation 
risk.58 The safety profile of vaccination with newer platforms like DNA,  
non-replicating viral vector, protein subunit, and RNA vaccines, including 
adjuvants,59 is less extensive than with platforms with long safety profiles like 
inactivated or live-attenuated vaccines.60 The use of DNA vaccines, for example, 
has raised safety concerns mainly regarding the probability of stable integration of 
transfected DNA into the genome of somatic or even germ cells, causing 
dysregulated gene expression and mutations.61 
Most COVID-19 vaccine candidates, and certainly the leading ones, are 
generally based on these new kinds of technologies, which are not licensed for use 
in humans anywhere in the world.62 AstraZeneca’s candidate, ChAdOx1 nCoV-19, 
for example, uses a chimpanzee adenovirus (the same that causes the common cold) 
to deliver a SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, which then prompts an immune response 
to that protein when exposure to the actual SARS-CoV-2 pathogen occurs.63 
Moderna’s and Pfizer’s vaccine candidates are based on messengerRNA (generally 
 
58. Michael M. McNeil, Julianne Gee, Eric S. Weintraub, Edward A. Belongia, Grace M. Lee, 
Jason M. Glanz, James D. Nordin, Nicola P. Klein, Roger Baxter, Allison L. Naleway, Lisa A. Jackson, 
Saad B. Omer, Steven J. Jacobsen & Frank DeStefano, The Vaccine Safety Datalink: Successes and 
Challenges Monitoring Vaccine Safety, 32 VACCINE 5390, 5393 (2014) (“Recognizing the need for a 
flexible, timely and robust system to evaluate vaccine safety and supplement information provided by 
VAERS, CDC established the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) in 1990 to conduct post-marketing 
vaccine safety evaluations in defined populations.”). 
59. Takehiro Ura, Kenji Okuda & Masaru Shimada, Developments in Viral Vector-Based 
Vaccines, 2 VACCINES 624, 632 (2014) (“Viral vector-based vaccines can be easily manufactured 
alongside traditional vaccines in large manufacturing units, and their safety profiles can be  
tested easily.”). 
60. Claudia Maria Trombetta, Elena Gianchecchi & Emanuele Montomoli, Influenza  
Vaccines: Evaluation of the Safety Profile, 14 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS, 657, 658 
(2018) (“Inactivated vaccines have an excellent safety profile.”). 
61. Jacob Glenting & Stephen Wessels, Ensuring Safety of DNA Vaccines, MICROBIAL CELL 
FACTORIES (Sept. 6, 2005), https://microbialcellfactories.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/ 
1475-2859-4-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE26-63GN] (“[I]nternational regulatory groups have recently 
questioned the safety of certain existing DNA vaccine constructs.”). 
62. Asher Mullard, COVID-19 Vaccine Development Pipeline Gears Up, 395 LANCET 1751, 
1751 (2020). 
63. Pedro M. Folegatti, Katie J. Ewer, Parvinder K. Aley, Brian Angus, Stephen Becker, Sandra 
Belij-Rammerstorfer, Duncan Bellamy, Sagida Bibi, Mustapha Bittaye, Elizabeth A. Clutterbuck, 
Christina Dold, Saul N. Faust, Adam Finn, Amy L. Flaxman, Bassam Hallis, Paul Heath, Daniel Jenkin, 
Rajeka Lazarus, Rebecca Makinson, Angela M. Minassian, Katina M. Pollock, Maheshi Ramasamy, 
Hannah Robinson, Matthew Snape, Richard Tarrant, Merryn Voysey, Catherine Green, Alexander  
D. Douglas, Adrian V.S. Hill, Teresa Lambe, Sarah C. Gilbert & Andrew J. Pollard, Safety and 
Immunogenicity of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 Vaccine Against SARS-CoV-2: A Preliminary Report of a 
Phase 1/2, Single-Blind, Randomised Controlled Trial, 396 LANCET 467, 468, (2020); Allison Martell  
& Julie Steenhuysen, Explainer: How Common Cold Viruses are Being Used in Vaccines from Russia, 
China, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2020, 3:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
vaccines-adenoviru/how-common-cold-viruses-are-being-used-in-vaccines-from-russia-china-idUSK 
BN25R192 [https://perma.cc/W2QZ-NSJ7 ]. 
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known as mRNA) that instruct human cells to produce protein antigens.64 The idea 
is that once a person receives those RNA instructions in an injected vaccine, their 
cells express proteins. These are then displayed on cell surfaces or released into the 
circulation, where the body’s natural immune system recognizes them.65 The 
regulatory review process generally vets vaccine candidates, not vaccine platforms; 
thus, there is no additional scrutiny given to new technologies that raise risks of 
causing dysregulated gene expression and/or mutations.66 
b. Side Effects Following Phase III and EUA COVID-19 Vaccines 
Incidents from Phase III trials have given a reasonable basis to prepare for 
severe side effects not only because the technologies are new but because the scale 
of mass vaccination is unprecedented. AstraZeneca’s Phase III trial was paused 
worldwide after two volunteers experienced inflammation of the spinal cord.67 
Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine trial was also paused during Phase III for rare blood-
clotting events.68 Two people in the U.K. had severe reactions to Pfizer’s vaccine 
within the first week.69 In the United States, there have been twenty-one cases of 
anaphylaxis and at least one suspected case linking vaccine administration to  
severe bleeding.70 
After significant doses were administered, safety signals were recorded for all 
leading vaccines: AstraZeneca’s (marketed as Vaxzevria in the EU), Johnson  
& Johnson’s, and Pfizer-BioNTech’s. In March 2021, with more than twenty-five 
million people receiving the Vaxzevria vaccine, more than twenty countries stopped 
vaccinations after reports of young patients suffering severe clotting disorders and 
rare types of strokes.71 The European Medicines Agency (EMA) safety committee 
 
64. Amber Dance, Coronavirus Vaccines Get a Biotech Boost, NATURE ( July 21, 2020), https://
www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02154-2 [https://perma.cc/W96K-U5B2]. 
65. Id. 
66. JOHNS HOPKINS, VACCINE PLATFORMS: STATE OF THE FIELD AND LOOMING 
CHALLENGES 5 (2019) (noting that “regulatory agencies approve products, not platforms”). 
67. Rachel Arthur, AstraZeneca Resumes US COVID-19 Vaccine Trial; Expects Results Later 
this Year, BIOPHARMA-REP. (Nov. 5, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/
Article/2020/10/26/AstraZeneca-resumes-US-COVID-19-vaccine-trial [https://perma.cc/JX53-9LMK]. 
68. Rachel Arthur, Johnson & Johnson Pauses COVID-19 Vaccine Trial Due to an Unexplained 




69. Sugden, supra note 16. 
70. Amy Goldstein, Laurie McGinley, Isaac Stanley-Becker & Fenit Nirappil, Biden Plans to 




71. Kai Kupferschmidt & Gretchen Vogel, European Countries Resume Use of AstraZeneca’s 
COVID-19 Vaccine, Hoping Pause has Not Dented Confidence, SCIENCE (Mar. 18, 2021), https://
www.sciencemag.org/news/2021/03/european-countries-resume-use-astrazenecas-covid-19-vaccine-
hoping-pause-has-not-dented [https://perma.cc/B4YN-X8RW]. 
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did an in-depth review of sixty-two cases of cerebral venous sinus thrombosis and 
twenty-four cases of splanchnic vein thrombosis, eighteen of which were fatal, that 
had been reported in the EU drug safety database as of March 18, 2021.72 On April 
7, 2021, the EMA concluded that unusual blood clots with low blood platelets 
should be listed as a very rare side effect of Vaxzevria.73 Several countries updated 
their recommendation on the use of Vaxzevria, with fifteen countries adopting 
specific recommendations to administer Vaxzevria only to certain age groups and 
twelve countries recommending use of Vaxzevria based on EMA guidelines with 
exceptions for those with a history or risk of thromboembolism and pregnant 
women.74 Two countries discontinued the use of Vaxzervia.75 
In the United States, the Johnson & Johnson vaccine was paused after reports 
of six cases of a rare and severe type of blood clot in individuals following 
administration of the vaccine.76 The FDA and CDC scientific teams examined 
available data of the 6.8 million doses that had been administered to assess the risk 
of thrombosis.77 
The EMA agency has concluded a review of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that 
has reports of facial swelling for people who have received dermal fillers and is 
continuing to follow reports of heart muscle inflammation after receipt of the 
Pfizer-BioNtech vaccine.78 
c. H1N1 
Assuming a severe side effect rate of 2.45 per 100,000—a measure based on 
the U.S. experience with pandemic H1N1 vaccine—and certainly at 11.1 cases per 
million, the scale of adverse events would be significant.79 The WHO estimates the 
delivery of two billion vaccine doses that will necessarily involve deployment of 
adenovirus (AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson) and messenger RNA (Moderna 
 
72. Press Release, Eur. Meds. Agency, AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 Vaccine: EMA Finds Possible 




74.  EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 18, at 1. 
75. Id. 
76. Press Release, U.S. FDA, FDA and CDC Lift Recommended Pause on Johnson & Johnson 




78. Kari Oakes, PRAC Investigates Heart Inflammation Reports with Pfizer Vaccine,  




79. Bardenheier et al., supra note 21, at 4408. 
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and Pfizer) vaccines as well as some based on conventional technologies.80 The 
same rate of severe side effects—those suffering disability or death or with illnesses 
requiring hospitalization—would reach 50,000 to 200,000 worldwide. That number 
may underestimate the prevalence and severity of side effects following COVID-19 
immunizations. Over the course of the H1N1 pandemic, an adjuvanted vaccine 
distributed by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was associated with a heightened risk of 
narcolepsy, a condition associated with people of Northern European descent. 
Adjuvanted H1N1 vaccines were not licensed in the United States.81 
In the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the negotiations over indemnification and 
immunity for manufacturers caused significant delays.82 When the 2009 H1N1 virus 
began emerging as a potential pandemic, pharmaceutical firms began negotiating 
with the WHO over conditions for the global distribution of a vaccine, which is the 
most important defense against a pandemic. 
From the manufacturers’ perspective, these negotiations occurred in the 
shadow of potentially large liabilities related to their existing contractual 
arrangements with governments, detailed processes for vaccine approval, 
distribution and marketing, as well as more general exposure should 
quickly-developed vaccines generate unexpected adverse reactions or 
safety problems. . . . In many jurisdictions, manufacturers bear legal 
responsibility for these adverse events, although many states change these 
liabilities in cases of public health emergencies. Nevertheless, 
manufacturers faced a range of legal barriers to production, donation and 
discounted sale of pandemic vaccines . . . .83 
The negotiations had two sources of delay: first, both manufacturers and 
countries had entered into agreements regarding purchasing vaccines, which 
severely curtailed manufacturers’ ability to donate vaccines as large numbers of their 
production were promised to wealthy states that had paid for them; second, the 
 
80. Helen Branswell, WHO, Partners Unveil Ambitious Plan to Deliver 2 Billion Doses of  
Covid-19 Vaccine to High-risk Populations, STAT ( June 26, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/
06/26/who-partners-unveil-ambitious-plan-to-deliver-2-billion-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-to-high-
risk-populations/ [https://perma.cc/7EZJ-PA5A]. 
81. DIV. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., VACCINE 
SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 85 (1985) (“A manufacturer who produces and sells a defective vaccine 
that creates a risk of significant injury to the recipient is liable to any person injured by that defect.”); 
Narcolepsy Following 2009 Pandemrix Influenza Vaccination in Europe, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/history/narcolepsy-flu.html 
[https://perma.cc/HG6C-2SQC] ( last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
82. INST. OF MED., THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE 2009-H1N1 
INFLUENZA A PANDEMIC: GLOBAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 12 
(2010) (“Progress toward mass immunization was temporarily stalled when the vaccine manufacturers 
demanded indemnification against claims of any adverse reactions associated with the vaccines.”). 
83. Sam F. Halabi, Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability: the Complex Contracting Relationship 
between Vaccine Manufacturers, WHO, Donor and Beneficiary Governments in MA Stoto and M Higdon (eds.), 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO H1N1: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 203-16 (Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
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vaccine manufacturers insisted on legal protections in countries where they were 
not licensed to produce or distribute a vaccine.84 
The U.S. experience with the 1976 H1N1 outbreak demonstrates some of 
these risks.85 The influenza pandemic of 1918 killed an estimated fifty million 
people, so governments around the world and the WHO have invested steeply in 
preparation for influenza.86 In 1976, a handful of soldiers in Fort Dix, New Jersey, 
were diagnosed with the virus.87 The CDC hosted a press conference and, although 
the virus never spread out of the base, the outbreak garnered significant media 
attention.88 President Ford initiated a program to vaccinate “every man, woman, 
and child in the United States.”89 Vaccine manufacturers began developing a 
vaccine, but during clinical testing, three subjects died of complications for reasons 
unrelated to the vaccine.90 This generated negative sentiment toward the vaccine. 
Then, over 400 people developed a rare neurological condition after receiving the 
vaccine, which resulted in the termination of the vaccine program.91 
The U.S. government and pharmaceutical manufacturers agreed in advance to 
an indemnification of risk for the manufacturer, which resulted in the  
U.S. government being the defendant in the suits arising from the vaccine 
complications. Ultimately, the United States was named as defendant in over 1,000 
lawsuits and paid approximately $83 million in claims.92 For comparison, the 
vaccination program as a whole was estimated to cost $134 million, with $100 
million for the development of the vaccine.93 
 
84. Id.; WHO Director-General, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the 
International Health Regulations (2005) in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, WHO Doc. A64/10 
(May 5, 2011) (“Among the key difficulties was a variation in willingness to donate, concerns about 
liability, complex negotiations over legal agreements, lack of procedures to bypass national regulatory 
requirements and limited national and local capacities to transport, store and administer vaccines.”). 
85. Rebecca Kreston, The Public Health Legacy of the 1976 Swine Flu Outbreak, DISCOVER 
MAG. (Sept. 30, 2013, 1:30 PM), https://www.discovermagazine.com/health/the-public-health-
legacy-of-the-1976-swine-flu-outbreak [https://perma.cc/85W6-YZPR]. 
86. Brooke Killian Kim & Jessica C. Wilson, COVID-19: Tort Immunity for Vaccines and 
Antivirals — Lessons from the Swine Flu of 1976, DLA PIPER (April 8, 2020), https:// 
www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/04/covid-19--tort-immunity-for-vaccines-and-
antivirals/[https://perma.cc/M4S5-GLWV]; see generally H.R. DOC. NO 77-115 (1977). 
87. Kim et al., supra note 86. 
88. President Gerald R. Ford, Remarks Announcing the National Swine Flu Immunization 
Program in the White House Briefing Room (March 24, 1976) (transcript available in the Gerald  
R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum); H.R. DOC. NO 77-115 (1977); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT  
& HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE 4, 
6–7 (1978). 
89. President Gerald R. Ford, supra note 88. 
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d. Dengue 
The dengue virus, transmitted by the aedes aegypti mosquito in tropical regions 
of the world, causes a range of symptoms, from subclinical, when people might not 
know they are infected, to symptoms similar to that of a severe influenza disease, 
which causes “bleeding, organ impairment, and/or plasma leakage.”94 The WHO 
estimates that there are 390 million dengue infections per year; of those, 96 million 
present with some severity of the virus and around 20,000 cases result in  
death—usually among children.95 Dengue is present in 129 countries, and over the 
last fifty years, it is believed that dengue has increased at least thirtyfold with a sharp 
increase after 2000.96 Since that point, it has been labeled a priority pathogen for the 
development of a licensed vaccine, but as with many diseases affecting poorer 
countries (seventy percent of cases occur in low-income countries in Asia), the 
actual market incentive for doing so is limited. 97 
After nearly twenty years of research and development, Sanofi Pasteur finally 
produced the CYD-TDV vaccine, licensed under the name Dengvaxia, the first and 
only approved vaccine to inoculate against dengue infection.98 To date, Dengvaxia 
has been registered in twenty99 countries including the EU member states and the 
United States.100 There have been two subnational101 immunization implementation 
 
94. Dengue and Severe Dengue, WORLD HEALTH ORG. ( June 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue [https://perma.cc/X4J6-T6U2]. 
95. Dengue Vaccine: WHO Position Paper –September 2018, 36 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
REC. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] 457, 458 (2018) [hereinafter Dengue Vaccine: WHO 
Paper ], https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/274315/WER9336.pdf?ua=1 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q4WF-NV42]; Sarah Murrell, Suh-Chin Wu & Michael Butler, Review of Dengue Virus and 
the Development of a Vaccine, 29 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 239, 240 (2011). 
96. See Murrell et al., supra note 95, at 240 (noting the belief that Dengue “DENV” is under 
reported because it can present asymptomatic or misreported because symptoms are similar to other 
viruses, additionally, the uptake after 2000 is believed to be sparked by “geographic expansion of the 
vector”); Dengue and Severe Dengue, supra note 94. 
97. See CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. & GLOB. HEALTH POL’Y RSCH. NETWORK, MAKING MARKETS 
FOR VACCINES: A PRACTICAL PLAN, 1, 24 https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/
SubmissionBarder1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV9G-THE5] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (Consultation 
Draft); Dengue Vaccine: WHO Paper, supra note 95, at 476. 
98. However, there are two vaccine candidates in Phase III trials at this time. Dengue  
Vaccine: WHO Paper, supra note 95, at 463. 
99. Some of the countries include: Mexico, the Philippines, Brazil, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Paraguay, Guatemala, Peru, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore. Sanofi’s Dengue Vaccine Approved in 
11 Countries, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2016, 10:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sanofi-
vacccine-idUSKCN1240C5 [https://perma.cc/3TN5-V9T7]. 
100. Dengvaxia has been approved by the FDA in the U.S. only for nine-to-sixteen-year-old 
children in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Guam. Angus Liu, After Safety 
Mess, Sanofi’s Dengue Shot Nabs a Sharply Limited FDA Nod, FIERCE PHARMA (May 2, 2019, 10:55 
AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/vaccines/sanofi-nabs-fda-nod-for-dengvaxia-despite-philippines 
-mess-but-a-much-smaller-population [https://perma.cc/U5CZ-FB4U]; Stephen J. Thomas & In-Kyu 
Yoon, A Review of Dengvaxia®: Development to Deployment, 15 HUM. VACCINES  
& IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2295, 2295 (2019). 
101. In a three-tiered governmental system—national, regional, and local  
government—subnational refers to regional and local government. Katja Rohrer, Chapter  
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public health programs in Brazil and the Philippines.102 The vaccine was studied 
over twenty-six clinical trials that included more than 41,000 volunteers.103 The 
clinical trial participants were monitored for up to five years after the trial.104 
Despite the large trial enrollment and postimmunization monitoring, it 
happens that for children under nine and for a subset of children who had never 
before been exposed to the virus, the vaccine increases the chance of severe disease, 
an occurrence that resulted in significant liabilities in the Philippines.105 On average, 
200,000 cases of dengue infection are reported every year in the Philippines.106 The 
aggregate direct medical cost for these infections in the country is estimated to be 
over $345 million per year and causes children to lose on average 5.6 days of school 
and adults to lose 9.9 days of work per episode.107 Dengvaxia was licensed in the 
Philippines in 2016.108 After licensure, a subnational Dengvaxia immunization 
program costing $67.7 million109 was developed with the goal of vaccinating one 
million Filipino children.110 The Philippines vaccinated 830,000 children ages nine 
to ten living in highly endemic regions111 before it was realized or acknowledged 
that there was an enhanced risk for severe illness for children who were 
seronegative—without antibodies to the virus.112 Sanofi Pasteur reported the safety 
issues in 2017, and the program was promptly ended.113 In 2019, the Philippines 
 
11: Strategizing for Health at Sub-national Level, in STRATEGIZING NATIONAL HEALTH IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: A HANDBOOK 1, 1 (Gerard Schmets, Dheepa Rajan & Sowmya Kadandale eds., 2016), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/250221/9789241549745-chapter11-eng.pdf?sequence 
=35&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/B29Z-2U3K]. 
102. Thomas & Yoon, supra note 100, at 2303, 2308. 
103. Id. at 2297. 
104. Stefan Flasche, Annelies Wilder-Smith, Joachim Hombach & Peter G. Smith, Estimating 
the Proportion of Vaccine-Induced Hospitalized Dengue Cases Among Dengvaxia Vaccines in the 
Philippines, WELLCOME OPEN RSCH. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://wellcomeopenresearch.org/articles/4-
165/v1 [https://perma.cc/5CA2-MHZJ] (version 1; peer review: 2 approved). 
105. Thomas & Yoon, supra note 100, at 2303, 2308. 
106. Mong Palatino, The Health of Thousands of Filipino Children Could Be at Risk, Thanks to 
Sanofi’s Dengue Vaccine, GLOB. VOICES (Dec. 7, 2017, 5:35 GMT), https://globalvoices.org/2017/
12/07/the-health-of-thousands-of-filipino-children-could-be-at-risk-thanks-to-sanofis-dengue-vaccine/ 
[https://perma.cc/25ZB-GVAG]. 
107. $365 million per year is measured in 2012 USD. Ronald U. Mendoza, Sheena A. Valenzuela 
& Manuel M. Dayrit, A Crisis of Confidence: The Case of Dengvaxia in the Philippines 1, 5 (Ateneo  
Sch. of Gov’t., Working Paper No. 20-002, 2020). 
108. Flasche et al., supra note 104, at 3. 
109. Karen Lema & Matthias Balmont, Philippines to Charge Officials of Sanofi, Government Over 
Dengue Vaccine, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2019, 12:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sanofi-fr-
philippines/philippines-to-charge-officials-of-sanofi-government-over-dengue-vaccine-idUSKCN1QI41L 
[https://perma.cc/959H-D2VY]. 
110. Flasche et al., supra note 104, at 3. 
111. “The dengue seroprevalance in this population is not known, but has been estimated to be 
between 80 and 85%, extrapolating from data from the trial sites in the Philippines included in the 
Phase 3 trial.” Id. at 3. 
112. Id. at 1. 
113. Id. at 3. 
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permanently banned Dengvaxia.114 Alleged delays by Sanofi in disclosing safety 
signals following Dengvaxia campaigns have resulted in criminal indictments against 
Sanofi executives, demands for repayment of the price of the Dengvaxia doses, and 
additional liabilities related to ten deaths attributed to Dengvaxia administration.115 
For these and other reasons, governments and global leaders must plan for 
liability and compensation as a component of the broader international response to 
COVID-19.116 In countries with strict liability regimes for vaccines, there is a limited 
obligation for a plaintiff to prove causation between the vaccination and the injury, 
only that the immunization and the injury are related in place and time.117 Even if a 
manufacturer took due care, that is, manufactured the vaccine non-negligently, 
vaccines will cause these rare severe injuries.118 
In most countries, a plaintiff (whether individual or governmental) is under an 
obligation to prove causation between an injury and the vaccine that preceded it.119 
The method by which causation is established under product liability law differs in 
key respects from the accepted method of establishing causation in science  
and epidemiology.120 
 
114. Carol Isoux, Are Philippine Children’s Deaths Linked to Dengue Vaccine?, POST  
MAG. (April 21, 2019, 2:30 AM), https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/
article/3006712/philippines-suspicion-dengue-vaccine-linked [https://perma.cc/DUY9-X85F]. 
115. Vince F. Nonato, Solon: Sanofi Will Be Held Liable for ‘Misrepresenting’ Dengvaxia Safety, 
PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER (Dec. 10, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/951181/solon-sanofi-
will-be-held-liable-for-misrepresenting-dengvaxia-safety [https://perma.cc/SHC4-B7XD] (“The 
House of Representatives Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability will hold Sanofi 
Pasteur liable for allegedly misrepresenting the side effects of Dengvaxia, as the French pharmaceutical 
giant only recently disclosed the risks months after the congressional inquiry had ended.”). The 
indictments are a good example of using respondeat superior theories when the Philippines Department 
of Justice is pursuing criminal allegations against Sanofi for omissions that are in fact attributable to the 
corporations, not its president or other indicted officers. See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate 
Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 2049 (2016). 
116. DIV. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., supra note 81, 
at 28 (“Testimony [in response to the expected DTP vaccine shortage due to unstable supplies]  
. . . from Squibb-Connaught indicated that [the vaccine distributors of DTP in 1984] had continued 
manufacturing vaccine and would be willing to distribute it if some federal protection were provided 
from [the high] liability risks.”). 
117. Clare Looker & Heath Kelly, No-fault Compensation Following Adverse Events Attributed 
to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, 89 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 371, 375 (2011), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/ 
270902/PMC3089384.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/B7Z4-6P3V] (“This process 
presumes causation if any injury listed in the table occurs within a specified time frame after 
vaccination. . . . [P]rogrammes are based on the premise that the adverse outcome is not attributable to 
a specific individual or industry but due to an unavoidable risk associated with vaccines.”). 
118. See id. at 371. 
119. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE CHILD.’S VACCINE INITIATIVE, INST. OF MED., THE 
CHILDREN’S VACCINE INITIATIVE: ACHIEVING THE VISION 163 (Violaine S. Mitchell, Nalini  
M. Philipose & Jay P. Sanford eds., 1993) (“If the conditions of the petitioner are not included in the 
table, they must then prove causation by a covered vaccine.”). 
120. DIV. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., supra note 81, 
at 85–86, 155 (“The difficulty of proving or disproving a causal relationship between a given vaccine 
and a particular injury suggests that if causation is required, for payment of compensation, outcomes 
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2. Perceived and Falsely Attributed Risks 
Not only will real and unknown risks shape legal liabilities but perceived 
associations will shape them as well.121 In many countries, propaganda campaigns 
inducing fears of sterility or of contracting HIV from vaccination inhibit use as well 
as fuel suspicions that manufacturers from wealthy countries use people in 
developing countries as human “guinea pigs.”122 For example, in 2013, a subset of 
religious leaders in Kenya initiated an antivaccine campaign based in part on these 
kinds of accusations.123 Demonstration projects with the HPV vaccine, aimed at 
preventing the cause of cervical cancer in virtually all cases, in the Indian states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat resulted in the preliminary (and erroneous) association 
of the vaccine with seven deaths, resulting in the suspension of those vaccination 
efforts, the discovery of defects in informed consent communications, and a 
significant delay of expanded HPV coverage.124 Reports of adverse events 
prompted litigation at the Supreme Court of India as well as a ministerial review of 
the informed consent protocols used by researchers.125 While no panel convened 
by the Supreme Court, the legislature, or the Ministry of Health and Welfare found 
any evidence that the vaccines caused any injuries, those entities found defects in 
informed consent procedures, and although not technically parties, GSK and Merck 
were required to respond to official inquiries.126 
Because causation will be a key aspect of any action to recover money 
damages, litigation risk is far more significant for perceived injuries or false 
attribution of background events to a vaccination.127 Many countries suffer from 
 
will depend on who is required to carry the burden of proof. . . . [T]hese efforts to prove causation will 
be time-consuming, expensive, and probably inconclusive.”). 
121. Eve Dubé, Caroline Laberge, Maryse Guay, Paul Bramadat, Réal Roy & Julie Bettinger, 
Vaccine Hesitancy: An Overview, 9 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1763, 1769 (“[R]isk 
perceptions are predictors of adult vaccination behavior.”). 
122. See Tara C. Smith, Vaccine Rejection and Hesitancy: A Review and Call to Action, OPEN  
F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Summer 2017, at 1, 1 (“[M]ultiple studies have demonstrated concerning 
patterns of decline of confidence in vaccines.”). 
123. Jill Olivier, Interventions with Local Faith Communities on Immunization in Development 
Contexts, REV. FAITH & INT’L AFFS., Fall 2016, at 36, 36 (“Kenyan Catholic Bishops called for a boycott 
of the . . . vaccine . . ., arguing that the vaccine was dangerous.”). 
124. R. Prasad, Opinion, A Second Chance for the HPV Vaccine, HINDU (Oct. 8, 2017, 3:33 
PM), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/a-second-chance-for-the-hpv-vaccine/
article19821936.ece [https://perma.cc/GR3W-EUAX]; Sanjay Kumar & Declan Butler, Calls in India 
for Legal Action Against US Charity, NATURE (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.nature.com/news/calls-
in-india-for-legal-action-against-us-charity-1.13700 [https://perma.cc/NJB7-6AT8]. 
125. Kumar & Butler, supra note 124; Carolijn Terwindt, Health Rights Litigation Pushes for 
Accountability in Clinical Trials in India, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J., Dec. 2014, at 84, 87–88, https://
cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2469/2014/12/Terwindt-final1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G5XT-TVXL]. 
126. Terwindt, supra note 125, at 88. 
127. See Richard Kent Zimmerman, James J. Schlesselman, Tammy A. Mieczkowski, Anne  
R. Medsger & Mahlon Raymund, Physician Concerns About Vaccine Adverse Effects and Potential 
Litigation, 152 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 12, 12 (1998) (“Physicians’ perceptions 
about the risk for adverse effects and protection afforded by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
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high background levels of morbidity and mortality, and coincidental deaths 
associated with vaccine administration attributed to the vaccine may give rise to 
litigation, even if rigorous analysis of objective data ultimately vindicates the 
manufacturer and its product.128 It is well established that there is widespread 
misunderstanding in developing countries about what respiratory illnesses are, how 
they are transmitted, and what their effects might be.129 Background skepticism of 
vaccine campaigns may increase the chance that specific events or injuries are 
attributed to COVID-19 vaccines.130 Moreover, COVID-19 vaccines are unlikely to 
be as efficacious as the most efficacious vaccines, like the measles vaccine, 
increasing the chance that someone who received an immunization and becomes ill 
may conflate the two.131 
 
influence their concern about litigation and, to a lesser extent, their reported likelihood to  
administer immunizations.”). 
128. Elaine R. Miller, Pedro L. Moro, Maria Cano & Tom Shimabukuro, Deaths Following 
Vaccination: What Does the Evidence Show?, 33 VACCINE 3288, 3288 (2015). 
129. Prisca Adhiambo Oria, Geoffrey Arunga, Emmaculate Lebo, Joshua M. Wong, Gideon 
Emukule, Philip Muthoka, Nancy Otieno, David Mutonga, Robert F. Breiman & Mark A. Katz, 
Assessing Parents’ Knowledge and Attitudes Towards Seasonal Influenza Vaccination of Children Before 
and After a Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Effectiveness Study in Low-income Urban and Rural Kenya, 
2010–2011, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 391, 395 (2013), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/ 
track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-391.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UTV-7XJW] (“Of the 36  
pre-vaccination focus group discussion participants, a majority said the main causes of influenza were 
low temperatures and dust. A few also said smoke, contact with influenza-infected persons and allergic 
reactions could cause influenza.”); Farhanah Abd Wahab, Sarimah Abdullah, Jafri Malin Abdullah, 
Hasnan Jaafar, Siti Suraiya Md Noor, Wan Mohd Zahiruddin Wan Mohammad, Abdul Aziz Mohamed 
Yusoff, John Tharakan, Shalini Bhaskar, Muthuraju Sangu, Mohd Shah Mahmood, Fauziah Kassim, 
Md. Hanip Rafia, Mohammed Safari Mohammed Haspani, Azmi Alias, Rogelio Hernández Pando, 
Updates on Knowledge, Attitude and Preventive Practices on Tuberculosis among Healthcare Workers, 23 
Malay. J. Med. Sci. 25, 30 (“A preliminary study of knowledge, attitudes and practices towards TB 
prevention was done in 2013 from two selected hospitals. Five family members were interviewed based 
on a questionnaire of knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of TB cases among nurses (30). It was 
found that only 20% of them had good knowledge. TB infection is commonly associated with lungs 
was correctly answered by 80% of the family members, while 80% said it is treatable and curable. 
However, 60% of them were still unaware that TB is caused by a bacterium called Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis. All of them believed that smoking (100%) is the main risk factor for TB, apart from alcohol 
and drug use (40%), other chronic diseases (20%), overcrowding and malnutrition (20%) and poverty 
(20%).”); Adela Ngwewondo, Lucia Nkengazong, Lum Abienwi Ambe, Jean Thierry Ebogo, Fabrice 
Medou Mba, Hamadama Oumarou Goni, Nyemb Nyunai, Marie Chantal Ngonde, Jean-Louis Essame 
Oyono, Knowledge, attitudes, practices of/towards COVID 19 preventive measures and symptoms: A  
cross-sectional study during the exponential rise of the outbreak in Cameroon, 14 PLOS Neglected Tropical 
Diseases 9 (2020).  
130. See id. at 397 (“While most parents in the fully vaccinated group had no concerns about 
the vaccine, half the parents in the partially and non-vaccinated groups had concerns about the vaccine; 
most said they were concerned about side effects because it was a new vaccine. Few parents of partially 
vaccinated children said they were concerned about side effects because they had heard of a child who 
had reacted negatively to vaccination. Parents of non-vaccinated children . . . ‘had serious doubts about 
it.’” (quoting parent on non-vaccinated children in Kibera and Lwak)). 
131. Malik Peiris & Gabriel M. Leung, What Can We Expect from First-generation COVID-19 
Vaccines?, 396 LANCET 1467, 1468 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-
6736%2820%2931976-0 [https://perma.cc/RYE2-XRH3]; Allison Aubrey, A COVID-19 Vaccine 
May Be Only 50% Effective. Is That Good Enough?, NPR (Sept. 12, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://
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Similarly, vaccine-related injuries may be attributable to contamination or 
infection from vaccines or syringes used improperly.132 The introduction of 
Johnson & Johnson’s Ebola vaccine candidate into the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo was complicated precisely because it required the administration of two 
doses two months apart.133 Nearly all current COVID-19 vaccine candidates require 
two doses administered months apart. 
C. Informed Consent and Product Labeling 
Informed consent is “an autonomous authorization by individuals of a medical 
intervention or of involvement in research,” which includes a decision to accept a 
health-care worker’s administration of a vaccine.134 Given the substantial interest by 
both manufacturers and third-party sponsors in obtaining as much information as 
possible about COVID-19 vaccine planning, implementation, and outcomes, there 
is likely to be a high correlation between individuals receiving vaccinations as 
patients and subjects of medical research. Informed consent is a process based on 
verbal and written communication between patients and health-care workers.135 
 
www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/12/911987987/a-covid-19-vaccine-may-be-only-50-
effective-is-that-good-enough [https://perma.cc/8DVT-8H3F]. As of January 13, 2020, 
AstraZeneca’s vaccine is seventy percent effective and requires two doses, and Pfizer’s vaccine is  
ninety-five percent effective and requires two doses. Compare these to the MMR vaccine which is 
ninety-seven percent effective and requires two doses. Aylin Woodward & Shayanne Gal, 3 Coronavirus 
Vaccines So Far Seem to Prevent COVID-19. Here’s How Their Efficacy Compares to Vaccines for Flu, 
Measles, and More., BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
how-pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine-compares-other-vaccines-2020-11?international=true&r=US&IR=T 
[https://perma.cc/5H5U-7ZFV]. 
132. World Health Org. [WHO], Vaccine Safety Basics: Learning Manual, at 75 (2013),  
https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/initiative/tech_support/Vaccine-safety-E-course-manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AC6U-VMPU] (outlining common immunization errors: “[r]euse of disposable 
syringe or needle leading to contamination of the vial, especially in multi-dose vials; [i]mproperly 
sterilized syringe or needle; [c]ontaminated vaccine or diluent”). 
133. Helen Branswell, Debate over Whether to Test a Second Ebola Vaccine Turns Acrimonious, 
STAT ( July 17, 2019) https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/17/debate-testing-second-ebola-
vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/N8LX-KMCJ]. 
134. K. Moodley, M. Pather & L. Myer, Informed Consent and Participant Perceptions of Influenza 
Vaccine Trials in South Africa, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 727, 727 (2005) (“Informed consent is fundamental 
to the ethical conduct of randomised controlled trials and is a critical component of the research 
process. Defined as ‘an autonomous authorization by individuals of a medical intervention or of 
involvement in research,’ the principle of informed consent is enshrined in all major guidelines for the 
ethical conduct of biomedical research. Informed consent is a process, based on verbal and written 
communication between participants and trial staff (or other individuals recruiting participants). The 
main pragmatic worry about informed consent is the different ways in which the process can fail—for 
example, because consent is not sought or because participants may not adequately understand the 
issues involved. Written trial materials are a central component of the informed consent process that is 
required by most major ethical guidelines. To enhance understanding of informed consent forms and 
related patient information materials, it is essential that these documents are highly readable.”). 
135. Elizabeth Gross Cohn, Haomiao Jia, Winifred Chapman Smith, Katherine Erwin & Elaine 
L. Larson., Measuring the Process and Quality of Informed Consent for Clinical Research: Development and 
Testing, 38 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 417, 418 (2011) (“Results also indicated that a successful consent 
process must include, at a minimum, the use of various communication modes (e.g., written, verbal, 
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“The main pragmatic concern about informed consent in the vaccine context is the 
different ways in which the process can fail—for example, because consent is not 
sought or because participants may not adequately understand” the factors involved 
in the decision to vaccinate because of a linguistic or other barrier.136 Informed 
consent for licensed and EUA vaccines must include information about the disease 
the vaccine is intended to prevent, the risks of contracting that disease without the 
vaccine, risks and benefits of the vaccine itself, and who should and who should 
not get the vaccine.137 
Liabilities arising from breaches of informed consent and product labeling 
accuracy are related. In many situations and contexts, manufacturer liability and 
provider liability will be distinct. A manufacturer will provide relevant information 
about the vaccine to the public sector or other procuring entity, and unaffiliated 
frontline health-care workers will translate product information to recipients.138 
However, vaccine manufacturers are often deeply involved in training health-care 
workers or support health-care worker training in partnership with governments 
and national and international organizations. Indeed, in many cases, it would be a 
best practice for a manufacturer to do so, or at least to monitor point-of-contact 
activity, given its interest in effective quality control. If a manufacturer’s product 
insert for a COVID-19 vaccine limits its use to specific subgroups, but the 
manufacturer simultaneously directly encourages health-care workers or supports 
the training of health-care workers to emphasize the known benefits of the 
vaccination in a way that deviates from the product labeling or discourages the 
dissemination of key evidence gaps in the product’s safety profile, the manufacturer 
is potentially liable for violations of the recipient’s informed consent.139 
These liability risks are even more relevant in a manufacturer’s assessment of 
wider participation in COVID-19 programs for at least three reasons. First, 
 
asking the participant to repeat what he or she understands), and is likely to require one-on-one 
interaction with someone knowledgeable about the study, such as a consent educator.”). 
136. Moodley et al., supra note 134, at 727; id.; David J. Diemert, Lucas Lobato, Ashley 
Styczynski, Maria Zumer, Amanda Soares & Maria Flavia Gazzinelli, A Comparison of the Quality of 
Informed Consent for Clinical Trials of an Experimental Hookworm Vaccine Conducted in Developed and 
Developing Countries, PLOS NEGL’D. TROPICAL DISEASES, Jan. 23, 2017, at 1, 2 (“The informed 
consent process depends upon five criteria: the willingness to participate, the capacity to make a 
decision, disclosure of information, comprehension, and the decision to participate.”). 
137. Heena Kakar, Ramandeep Singh Gambhir, Simarpreet Singh, Amarinder Kaur & Tarun 
Nanda, Informed Consent: Corner Stone in Ethical Medical and Dental Practice, 3  
J. FAM. MED. & PRIMARY CARE 68, 68 (2014) (“In medical terms, informed consent implies to 
‘providing sufficient information for a patient to make an informed and rational choice, the information 
includes the inherent risks and alternatives that a reasonable doctor would provide having regard to the 
particular circumstances of the patient.’”). 
138. DIV. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., supra note 81, 
at  87 (“If a product is not sold directly to the public, but is distributed through intermediaries who can 
be expected to know about the product and its risks and to be responsible for informing the ultimate 
consumer on its proper use, then the manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the public (although 
it does have a duty to warn the intermediaries of risks not known to them).”). 
139. See id. 
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violations of the principle of informed consent may be serious and widespread in 
an accelerated global immunization campaign, and such breaches of informed 
consent may also be independent from any injury resulting from product use.140 
Second, the law of informed consent in many jurisdictions is ambiguous, often 
forged from existing codes of medical ethics and broadly worded constitutional and 
statutory protections.141 Third, informed consent law is context-specific. Legal 
liabilities may turn on the relative age, education, and sophistication of a recipient; 
disclosures a health-care worker makes about commercial influences; and rules of 
evidence that favor presumption toward the recipient’s or the health-care worker’s 
testimony.142 For example, written communication that is not in the recipient’s 
native tongue or is not properly translated may fail to meet the necessary standard 
of informed consent. Further, written communication that does not account for 
cultural, sociological, and linguistic barriers may not meet standards of sufficient 
informed consent.143 While evidence is sparse, there has been sufficient fieldwork 
concluded by public health researchers to establish that the demand for information 
by potential immunization target populations may be complex and introduce a 
number of difficulties in respecting informed consent law while furthering the goal 
of broader immunization efforts. 144 
 
140. Anna Zagaja, Rafał Patryn, Jakub Pawlikowski & Jarosław Sak, Informed Consent in 
Obligatory Vaccinations?, 24 MED. SCI. MONITOR 8506, 8507 (2018). (“Currently over 100 million 
children are vaccinated each year against infectious diseases such as measles, hepatitis B, diphtheria, 
tuberculosis, or polio. According to the European Commission, vaccinations prevent approximately 2.5 
million deaths worldwide annually and reduce disease-specific treatment costs. . . . In the case of a 
vaccination obligation . . ., individual autonomy is faced off against the state rules and regulations and 
a clash between individual’s rights and public safety becomes apparent. Here we consider 2 mechanisms. 
The first is protecting individual autonomy (i.e., informed consent); the second is protecting the 
common good of society (i.e., public health protection through obligatory vaccinations). Currently, a 
lot of pressure is placed on obtaining informed consent from patients prior to invasive procedures, 
including vaccinations.”). 
141. See, e.g., Med. & Dental Prac. Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo [2001] AHRLR 159, ¶ 72 
(Nigeria) (“The scope and limit of the duty of a practitioner [with respect to informed consent]  
. . . cannot be considered in isolation of the right of the patient. Although, there is a dearth of local 
authorities in this area of our law, there are ample provisions of our Constitution which show the basis 
on which the Court should proceed in these matters.”). 
142. See A.O. Adejumo, Sociocultural Factors Influencing Consent for Research in Nigeria: Lessons 
from Pfizer′s Trovan Clinical Trial, 11 AFR. J. PSYCH. STUD. SOC. ISSUES 229, 229, (2008). 
143. See Stella Burch Elias, Regional Minorities, Immigrants, and Migrants: The Reframing of 
Minority Language Rights in Europe, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 261, 311 (2010) (emphasizing the role of 
language recognition in achieving full realization of rights in the EU). 
144. See Oria et al., supra note 129, at 5 (“Whether or not I accept to vaccinate my child will 
depend on the information I receive from those promoting the vaccine. I must be told how safe the 
vaccine is, how the vaccine will benefit my child, and from where the vaccine has come.” (quoting a 
mother in Kibera)); Julie Leask, Annette Braunack-Mayer & Ian Kerridge, Consent and Public 
Engagement in an Era of Expanded Childhood Immunization, 47 J. PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 603, 
603 (2011) (“For consent to be valid, patients (or their parents) must be competent to make the decision, 
sufficiently informed, understand the information provided and be able to act freely and voluntarily.”). 
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II. GLOBAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE DEPENDS ON FAIRNESS TO THOSE 
SUFFERING SEVERE SIDE EFFECTS FOLLOWING IMMUNIZATION AND LEGAL 
ASSURANCE TO MANUFACTURERS 
National and global public health leaders have long known that the response 
to a global viral pandemic would require a system to develop and distribute vaccines, 
including a system for liability and compensation, but governments and 
organizations have done relatively little in light of that knowledge. 
The H1N1 pandemic was declared in April 2009, and a vaccine specific to the 
pathogen was developed by September 2009.145 Yet negotiations between 
manufacturers, the WHO, and donating and receiving governments over liability 
and indemnity delayed the distribution of vaccines until late December 2009/early 
January 2010.146 In October 2014, the WHO; supporting governments and their 
agencies (especially the United States, the U.K., and France); and the governments 
of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone convened a meeting to discuss the possibility 
of deploying, on an emergency use basis, vaccine candidates against the Ebola virus 
disease.147 Again, the issue of liability and compensation thwarted such deployment, 
and the experimental vaccine was never administered outside the clinical  
trial context.148 
The failure to resolve the vaccine product liability problem stands in the way 
of access to vaccines for the world’s most vulnerable countries. In the wake of 
COVID-19, there are two general approaches to procuring vaccines: (1) bilateral 
contracts with manufacturers that include assurances against product liability claims 
or (2) distribution through the COVAX Facility, an international organization that 
invests in vaccine candidates, requires financial commitments from procuring 
governments, and ultimately will match recipient governments with manufacturers 
when vaccines have been licensed or authorized pursuant to an EUA.149 
By mid-August 2020, the United States had secured 800 million doses of at 
least six vaccines in development, with an option to purchase around one billion 
more.150 The U.K. was the world’s highest per-capita buyer, with 340 million doses 
 
145. The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009-April 2020, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ( June 16, 2010), https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/
cdcresponse.htm [https://perma.cc/7M8Y-UJY7]. 
146. Halabi, supra note 48, at 207. 
147. Ana Maria Henao-Restrepo, Marie-Pierre Preziosi, David Wood, Vasee Moorthy, Marie 
Paule Kieny & The WHO Ebola Research, Development Team, On a Path to Accelerate Access to Ebola 
Vaccines: The WHO’s Research and Development Efforts During the 2014–2016 Ebola Epidemic in West 
Africa, 17 CURRENT OP. VIROLOGY 138, 139 (2016). 
148.  Sam Halabi, Andrew Heinrich & Saad B. Omer, No-Fault Vaccine Injury  
Compensation – The Other Side of Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines, 383 NEW  
ENG. J. MED. e125(1)–(2) (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2030600?article 
Tools=true [https://perma.cc/7C8V-9WJ8]. 
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purchased: around five doses for each citizen. The EU nations—which are buying 
vaccines as a group—and Japan have locked down hundreds of millions of doses 
of vaccines for themselves.151 
A. The Structure of the COVAX Facility 
For the vast majority of the world’s governments, bilateral procurement is out 
of reach for purely financial reasons.152 Even for wealthier governments, bilateral 
contracts may not be a panacea. As of early January 2021, there have been a limited 
number of safe and effective vaccines approved. Vaccines entering Phase III clinical 
trials only succeed at about sixteen percent.153 The solution to the dichotomy 
between richer and poorer countries dealing with the vaccine access problem is the 
COVAX Facility, an international partnership that convenes wealthy  
(“self-financing”) governments interested in diversifying their investments in 
potentially successful vaccine candidates, manufacturers of those candidates, and 
low- and lower-middle-income countries (“donor countries”) that may offer a 
relatively modest up-front commitment but cannot afford bilateral  
procurement—certainly not for candidates that may fail. 
The COVAX Facility originated within a broader international collaboration 
known as the ACT (Access to COVID-19 Tools) Accelerator,154 an initiative led by 
the World Bank, the WHO, G20, European Commission, and a consortium of 
major global public health non-governmental organizations including the Bill  
& Melinda Gates Foundation and other private donors to advance the goal of 
fostering the development and production of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines 
to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.155 The ACT Accelerator, launched in April 
2020, is comprised of four pillars: the Diagnostic Pillar supported by the Foundation 
for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculous, and Malaria (Global Fund); the Therapeutics Pillar supported by 
 
151. Id. 
152. Gavin Yamey, Opinion, A Coronavirus Vaccine Should Be for Everyone, Not Just Those 
Who Can Afford It, STAT (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/05/coronavirus-
vaccine-affordable-for-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/2E2L-H3T4] (“Without price controls, poor 
countries are unlikely to be able to afford or access enough vaccines to protect their populations.”); 
Adam Hancock, Why Developing Countries May Be the Last to Get the Vaccine, EU OBSERVER (May 28, 
2020, 07:04 AM), https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148470 [https://perma.cc/GC6F-9GYG] 
(“To put it bluntly, they simply can’t afford most of the new vaccines being produced.”). 
153. Shanay Rab, Afjal, Mohd Javaid, Abid Haleem & Raju Vaishya, An Update on the Global 
Vaccine Development for Coronavirus, 14 DIABETES & METABOLIC SYNDROME: CLINICAL  
RSCH. & REVS. 2053, 2053 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7582051/ 
pdf/main.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCS9-GA2R]. 
154. Seth Berkley, COVAX Explained, GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained [https://perma.cc/SM29-JVVF]. 
155. Margaret “Peggy” Hamburg, Former Comm’r, U.S. FDA, Remarks at The Scramble for 
Vaccines and the COVAX Facility 3 (Aug. 11, 2020), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/publication/200811_Scramble_Vaccines.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CK-GRP2]; Donor 
Profiles, GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/donor-
profiles [https://perma.cc/F9ZN-YTMM] (May 28, 2021). 
Clean Final Edit_Halabi_V3.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:15 AM 
2021] PANDEMIC VACCINE PRODUCT LIABILITY 139 
Unitaid and Wellcome Trust; the Health Systems Pillar supported by the World 
Bank, Global Fund, and the WHO; and the Vaccine Pillar supported by Gavi, the 
Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
(CEPI), and the WHO.156 
The Vaccine Pillar, “COVAX” or the “COVAX Facility,”157 was established 
in June 2020.158 It was founded to support the quick and safe development, 
manufacture, and delivery of a COVID-19 vaccine worldwide.159 COVAX aims to 
deliver two billion doses of a safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine by the end of 
2021.160 In order to achieve this objective, COVAX invests across a wide portfolio 
of vaccine candidates using contributions from eighty-nine self-financing 
governments and supporting international organizations and charities and, at the 
same time, requiring financial commitments from ninety-two “donor supported” 
governments that will receive subsidized prices for doses.161 
Within COVAX, CEPI leads the development and manufacturing 
workstream, which supports research and development and manufacturing 
expansion through direct financial investments.162 GAVI is the lead organization 
for vaccine procurement and as well as the COVAX Advance Market Commitment 
(AMC), which helps finance low- and lower-middle-income countries’ access to a 
future COVID-19 vaccine.163 
 
156. Press Release, World Health Org., ACT-Accelerator Update: Publication of Investment Cases, 
( June 26, 2020) [hereinafter ACT-Accelerator Update], https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/26-
06-2020-act-accelerator-update [https://perma.cc/J7YS-CXNJ]; Jonathan C. Carlson, Strengthening the 
Property-Rights Regime for Plant Genetic Resources: The Role of the World Bank, 6 TRANSNAT’L  
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 112–13 (1996) (identifying the evolving role of the World Bank from 
discrete project funding to broader, structural efforts). 
157. The Vaccine Pillar is also referred to as “COVAX Facility” or “the Facility” in  
online sources. 
158. ACT-Accelerator Update, supra note 156. 
159. Id. 
160. More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, supra  
note 3.  
161. WHO, COVAX Announces Additional Deals, supra note 11. (announcing that  
CEPI-Support candidate vaccines include: Invio in United States (Phase II); Moderna in United States 
(Phase III); CureVac in Germany (Phase IIB/III); Institute Pasteur/Merck/Themis in France, United 
States, Austria (Phase I); AstraZeneca/University of Oxford in U.K., Northern Ireland (Phase III); 
University of Hong Kong in China (Preclinical); Novavax in United States (Phase III); Clover 
Biopharmaceuticals in China (Phase I); University of Queensland/CSL in Australia (Phase I)). 
162. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Report to the Board on COVAX Facility Structure and 
Governance, Agenda Item 04b ( July 30, 2020) [hereinafter Gavi Facility Structure and Governance], 
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/board/minutes/2020/30-july/04b%20-%20COVAX%20 
Facility%20Structure%20and%20Governance_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA9M-X6KE]. 
163. Id. at 2–3; Mark Turner, Vaccine Procurement During an Influenza Pandemic and the Role of 
Advance Purchase Agreements: Lessons from 2009-H1N1, 11 GLOB. PUB. HEALTH 322, 327 (2016) (“A 
2009 survey by the WHO of pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers asked whether they would be 
willing to reserve 10% of real-time production for acquisition by UN agencies, 14 out of 25 were unable 
to meet the request to set aside 10% of their production capacity, because they were constrained by 
meeting the volume of vaccines reserved via APAs.”). 
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The COVAX Facility itself has no legal personality—it cannot enter into 
contracts, and it is not susceptible to legal process in any of the jurisdictions where 
its stakeholder organizations reside. GAVI, an international organization 
incorporated under the Swiss Host State Act, is the administrator and legal 
personality of COVAX.164 The GAVI Board is responsible for overseeing GAVI’s 
role in COVAX, and its CEO, Seth Berkley, coordinates with the leaders of the 
other stakeholder organizations in managing GAVI’s role.165 GAVI’s Market 
Sensitive Decision Committee is responsible for reviewing proposed agreements, 
and GAVI’s Audit and Finance Committee is responsible for tracking and reviewing 
all COVAX funding.166 
GAVI is also responsible for the office of the COVAX Facility. In this role, 
GAVI is responsible for negotiating agreements with self-financing countries, 
tripartite agreements with multilateral development banks, and agreements with 
manufacturers with volume guarantees; managing the vaccine candidate portfolio 
(along with other advisors); assembling the Shareholders Counsel and Independent 
Product Group; and overseeing all administrative functions.167 Prior to becoming 
the legal personality of COVAX, GAVI spent $1.4 million on setup activities for 
COVAX and AMC.168 As the legal personality, GAVI will seek reimbursement for 
these fees through money paid into COVAX by the self-financing participants.169 
The self-financing participants’ COVAX payments are expected to cover all 
operating costs, which are expected to be around seven million dollars for the  
next year.170 
Additionally, within COVAX, GAVI is responsible for vaccine procurement 
and scaling-up delivery of a vaccine for low- and lower-middle-income countries 
 
164. Bd. of Dirs., Review of Decisions of July 30, 2020 Board Meeting, 7 ( July 30, 2020), https:/
/www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/board/minutes/2020/30-july/Board-2020-Mtg-4-Review%20of 
%20Decisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/47GN-G5SG]. 
165. Id. at 11; Dr Seth Berkley, Gavi CEO, GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, https://
www.gavi.org/operating-model/gavi-secretariat/seth-berkley [https://perma.cc/2FXB-LUTH] (June 
8, 2021). 
166. Gavi Facility Structure and Governance, supra note 162, at 10–11. (noting that the MSDC 
is comprised of the “Board Chair . . . the Program and Policy Committee Chair, representatives of 
multilaterals, a representative of [the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation], representatives of 
implementing country governments (2), representatives of donor country governments (3), a 
representative of the Civil Society Organizations,” and most likely representatives of  
self-financing countries). 
167. Id. at 11–12 (noting that the Shareholders Council includes representatives from  
self-financing countries as well as AMC (financed) countries. The Council provides strategic guidance 
for vaccine development and vaccine allocation). 
168. Id. at 14. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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through COVAX AMC.171 All AMC-approved countries172 are also eligible for cold 
chain support to effectively and safely deliver the COVID-19 vaccine.173 GAVI will 
be providing support to AMC countries over the next ten years; however, current 
estimations predict that COVAX will only need to be active for the next three 
years.174 Therefore, the AMC program is designed to support lower- and  
lower-middle-income countries for an extended period of time—long after the 
shut-down of COVAX.175 
AMC was founded through a Stakeholder Agreement with GAVI.176 Members 
of the Stakeholder group include AMC donors such as the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Pan American Health Organization, AMC participant 
country representatives, development and regional banks involved in funding, and 
private sector and philanthropic donors.177 The AMC Stakeholder group will be 
represented on the COVAX Shareholders Council.178 
The candidate vaccine portfolio is currently being run by CEPI and GAVI.179 
All proposed candidate vaccines are vetted by the Independent Product Group.180 
The Independent Product Group is comprised of five to seven experts who 
continuously review data on candidate vaccines, provide a score based on 
predetermined criteria in order to make recommendations, and support COVAX’s 
portfolio management.181 
High-income, self-financing governments can invest in the diverse portfolio 
of candidate vaccines.182 When self-financing governments join COVAX as 
“participating countries,” a binding agreement is established to purchase a 
predefined number of doses, determine an initial investment in the program 
proportionate to the number of doses requested, and set dose contributions if the 
country has entered into other bilateral agreements.183 Self-financing governments 
must also commit to numerous nonfinancial obligations such as supporting the 
 
171. More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, supra 
note 3. 
172. See 172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global 
Access Facility, infra note 195 (listing all AMC-supported countries). 
173. More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, supra 
note 3. 
174. Gavi Facility Structure and Governance, supra note 162, at 15. 
175. Id. 
176. Margaret “Peggy” Hamburg, supra note 155, at 3. 
177. Aurélia Nguyen, COVAX Facility Governance Explained, GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE 
(Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-facility-governance-explained [https:// 
perma.cc/45PL-B6N4]. 
178. Gavi Facility Structure and Governance, supra note 162, at 11. 
179. Margaret “Peggy” Hamburg, supra note 155, at 3. 
180. ACT ACCELERATOR COVAX PILLAR - INDEPENDENT PRODUCT GROUP, GAVI, THE 
VACCINE ALLIANCE 1–2 (2020), https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/2020/IPG 
_Call-for-nominations-8jul.pdf [https://perma.cc/54BF-BVUD]. 
181. Id. 
182. Berkley, supra note 154. 
183. Id. 
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movement of a vaccine, fast-tracking licensure of a vaccine, reporting all 
epidemiological and virological data, and maintaining transparency about all bilateral 
vaccine agreements.184 The benefit of becoming a participating country includes 
access to the diverse candidate vaccine portfolio, which translates to a higher 
probability of accessing a COVID-19 vaccine.185 
The WHO is leading the policy and allocation workstream to develop global 
policy recommendations and an allocation framework including the Strategic 
Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization.186 The WHO SAGE will 
make recommendations and advise on how a vaccine will be distributed within  
a country.187 
“COVAX is the only truly global solution to the COVID-19 pandemic.”188 
The COVAX model for vaccine procurement with its portfolio-based investment 
advertises a higher probability of a successful vaccine for self-financing countries. 
For self-financing countries, COVAX is an insurance policy to enhance a country’s 
probability of securing a vaccine beyond the current bilateral agreements.189 
Originally, the COVAX Facility had arrangements for first-wave access for 
around two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine candidates,190 making COVAX one 
of the largest and most diverse vaccine portfolios in the world (export controls 
imposed by India during its delta variant wave and problems with J&J procurement 
have reduced this initial ambitious goal).191AstraZeneca-Oxford University and 
Novavax, both vaccine developers, have entered into contracts with COVAX.192 
Serum Institute of India, a manufacturer, has agreed to limit the price of a vaccine 
produced by AstraZeneca or Novavax to three dollars per dose for low- and  
lower-middle-income countries also through a COVAX agreement.193 Seven of the 
 
184. Gavi Facility Structure and Governance, supra note 162, at 4. 
185. Berkley, supra note 154. 
186. Gavi Facility Structure and Governance, supra note 162, at 3. 
187. World Health Org. [WHO], Allocation Mechanism for COVAX Facility Vaccines, at 1, 3 
(Nov. 12, 2020) [hereinafter WHO, Allocation Mechanism ]. 
188. More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, supra 
note 3. 
189. Id. 
190. WHO, COVAX Announces Additional Deals, supra note 11. 
191. Divya Rajagopal, WHO Reviews Nine Vaccine Candidates for COVAX Alliance,  
ECON. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/
biotech/who-reviews-nine-vaccine-candidates-for-covax-alliance/articleshow/77733032.cms [https:// 
perma.cc/2WSM-79XA]. Neha Arora and Krishna N. Das, Rupam Jain, EXCLUSIVE: India unlikely 




193. Divya Rajagopal, Serum Institute to Price Covid-19 Vaccine at $3 per Dose for India and 
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nine current partnership candidate vaccines are in clinical trials.194 Eighty-nine 
higher-income countries have joined COVAX.195 These self-financing governments 
will help support the ninety-two COVAX AMC member countries, which are 
considered “funded” or “donor supported” participants.196 Some governments, like 
France and Germany, have agreed to financially support COVAX although they 
will not buy candidate vaccines through the COVAX program, rather, opting to 
procure through a EU scheme.197 Before 2021, the United States rejected COVAX, 
declaring, “we will not be constrained by multilateral organizations influenced by 
the corrupt World Health Organization and China” but has since decided to 
contribute financially to the organization. 198 
 
194. WHO, COVAX Announces Additional Deals, supra note 11. 
195. Id.; GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, COVAX: COMMITMENT AGREEMENTS 2–3 (2020), 
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/pr/COVAX_CA_COIP_List_COVAX_PR_15-12. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/VLK4-LXZX] (listing the countries that have entered into commitment 
agreements with COVAX and agreed to be publicly named: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungry, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, 
Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania , Saudi Arabia, 
Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, and Venezuela). 
196. Press Release, World Health Org., 172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines 
Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/
item/24-08-2020-172-countries-and-multiple-candidate-vaccines-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-
access-facility [https://perma.cc/Q4MZ-XKGG] (noting that the GAVI board agreed in July 2020 
that the following countries will be supported by the COVAX AMC: Low income countries include 
Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and 
Yemen. Lower-middle income countries include Angola, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cabo 
Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, 
Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Lesotho, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Additional IDA-eligible countries include Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kosovo, 
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Samoa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga and Tuvalu). 
197. Andreas Rinke, EXCLUSIVE-Germany Won’t Buy Vaccines Through WHO’s COVAX 
Scheme - Sources, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-
who-germany/exclusive-germany-wont-buy-vaccines-through-whos-covax-scheme-sources-idUSL8N 
2GF3JM [https://perma.cc/4JUM-42UT]. 
198. Stephanie Nebehay, U.S., Staying in WHO, to Join COVID Vaccine Push for Poor Nations 
- Fauci, REUTERS ( Jan. 21, 2021, 1:32 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-staying-who-
join-covid-vaccine-push-poor-nations-fauci-2021-01-21/ [https://perma.cc/N6SZ-7Z79]; Emily 
Rauhala & Yasmeen Abutaleb, U.S. Says It Won’t Join WHO-linked Effort to Develop, Distribute 
Coronavirus Vaccine, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2020, 2:42 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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After the creation of a safe and effective vaccine, the next hurdle COVAX will 
face is prioritizing to whom the vaccine will be available in the initial low-production 
period.199 The WHO Allocation Mechanism is responsible for making dose 
allocation assessment in line with three goals: to “set . . . overarching principles for 
access to and allocation of health products for COVID-19,” to set a “global 
framework to ensure equitable and fair access and allocation of COVID-19 health 
products,” and to establish “fair and equitable allocation mechanisms for each 
product stream.”200 Currently, the WHO is recommending that priority populations 
such as health-care workers, adults over sixty-five, and high-risk adults with 
underlying conditions receive one of the first doses of the vaccine.201 All COVAX 
participants (self-financing and funded) will initially receive doses to cover up to 
twenty percent of their population through a proportional allocation scheme.202 
Next, all participants will receive weighted allocation beyond twenty percent of their 
population.203 Weighted allocation is invoked if there is a severe supply constraint. 
If such a case were to occur, a country’s requested vaccine supply would be 
dispersed in accordance with a risk assessment score that evaluates the country’s 
“threat and vulnerability,” resulting in a risk rating. A higher risk rating means 
vaccine doses will be provided more quickly.204 
As of October 19, 2021, COVAX-facilitated vaccines had shipped 371 million 
doses to 144 participants (almost all of which are recognized countries).205 It is 
known that those countries have agreed to indemnify AstraZeneca and Serum 
Institute of India, the manufacturers, against liability for adverse events. It is not 
known, however, which, if any, steps they have taken to compensate those who may 




199. COVAX, COVAX, THE ACT-ACCELERATOR VACCINES PILLAR: INSURING 
ACCELERATED VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE 1, 3 (2020) [hereinafter COVAX, THE 
ACT-ACCELERATOR VACCINES PILLAR ], https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/COVAX-
Pillar-background.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BS-XRDF]. 
200. World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Concept for Fair Access and Equitable Allocation of 
COVID-19 Health Products, at 1, 6 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/ 
who-covid19-vaccine-allocation-final-working-version-9sept.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMZ4-M7AV]. 
201. Id. at 24; See COVAX, the Act-Accelerator Vaccines Pillar, supra note 199 at 3 (noting that 
“[p]olicy recommendations will lay out the priority populations” listed to be considered for the first 
round of vaccinations). 
202. WHO, Allocation Mechanism, supra note 187. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 5. 
205. COVAX Vaccine Roll-Out, GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/ 
covax-vaccine-roll-out [https://perma.cc/C3RY-AMHQ] ( last visited Oct. 7, 2021).  
206. Press Release, World Health Org., First COVID-19 COVAX Vaccine Doses Administered 
in Africa (March 1, 2021) https://www.who.int/news/item/01-03-2021-first-covid-19-covax-vaccine-
doses-administered-in-africa [https://perma.cc/T33D-JWW5]. 
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B. Liability and Compensation for Vaccine Injury Pose Barriers to both Manufacturer and 
Government Participation in COVAX 
Despite the tremendous amount of ex ante planning for equitable vaccine 
access, there is no resolution at the COVAX Facility about what to do about ex post 
liability for vaccine injury.207 According to internal documents, GAVI has 
communicated to donor supported governments that manufacturers will require 
“assurances that they won’t face product liability claims over deaths or side effects 
from their vaccines.”208 Thailand, for example, has entered into only a nonbinding 
commitment with COVAX and has identified the liability and compensation matter 
as material to its decision to participate.209 Kenya, which is eligible for COVAX 
AMC membership,210 
said it was premature to say who should carry the liability for potential 
adverse effects but expected the vaccine makers to bear some of the 
responsibility, according to Rashid Aman, chief administrative secretary at 
the [M]inistry of [H]ealth. . . . 
. . . . 
This is one of the reasons why the EU has decided not to take delivery 
of vaccines through COVAX even though the 27-nation bloc has pledged 
money to the facility, [an EU] official said, noting that deals the EU is 
separately negotiating with vaccine companies involve clauses that make 
firms liable for potential compensation.211 
Manufacturers, for their part, have made it clear that without legal assurances, 
they will not ship vaccines to any country, whether or not it participates in 
 
207. GAVI, THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, COVID-19 VACCINE GLOBAL ACCESS (COVAX) 
FACILITY, PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL DESIGN: DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 17 ( 2020), https://
www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/COVAX-Facility-Preliminary-technical-design-061120-vF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WM7V-MZL6] (“In addition to the pull funding design elements described above, 
there are other critical design elements of manufacturer-specific volume guarantees, in the form of 
contractual conditions, to be considered, which may include: Meeting minimal and/or preferred 
characteristics of normative WHO standards for COVID-19 pandemic response vaccines; Regulatory 
approval by a maturity level (ML)3/ML4 regulatory authority and WHO prequalification; Desirability 
of vaccine profile potentially influencing size of volume guarantee (e.g. if some product presentations 
are unsuitable for LICs / LMICs e.g. intravenous administration or large below-freezing cold chain 
requirements); Confirmed ability to export from supplier and host government; If the supplier also 
produces routine life-saving antigens, agreement that disruption of supply of other vaccines to  
Gavi / LICs / LMICs will be minimized; Agreement with conditions of liability / indemnity mechanisms 
being created.” (emphasis added)). 
208. Maria Cheng & Lori Hinnant, Push to Bring Coronavirus Vaccines to the Poor Faces Trouble, 
AP NEWS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/international-news-lifestyle-business-science-
virus-outbreak-6656cba6143eb097da3dc7c8b360bfa4 [https://perma.cc/M4KP-J4D5]. 
209. Id. 
210. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
211. Francesco Guarascio, Lack of Clarity on Liability Could Cause Delay with WHO 
Coronavirus Vaccine Drive, INS. J. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
international/2020/10/16/586726.htm [https://perma.cc/SV3E-ALFB]. 
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COVAX.212 AstraZeneca, for example, has stated that in its bilateral contracts, it 
has been granted protection from legal claims arising from the use of its products, 
as it “cannot take the risk” of liability for side effects.213 As early as 2006, the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations 
(IFPMA), the global industry lobbying group, stated publicly that it demanded legal 
immunity for vaccine adverse events in order to participate in pandemic response.214 
In 2006, the IFPMA, in the wake of a potential H5N1 pandemic, stated 
[I]n some countries, existing pharmacovigilance systems may fail to detect 
key signals until after the vaccines have already been administered to 
hundreds or thousands or millions of people. Many of the individuals 
vaccinated could develop medical conditions, by chance alone and 
unrelated to the vaccine, at some point following vaccination. It is 
inevitable that many will expect to be compensated. This is why [IFPMA] 
call(s) for a waiver of liability for the manufacturing and use of  
pandemic vaccines.215 
During the 2009–2010 H1N1 pandemic, manufacturers reiterated their 
concerns with potential product liability lawsuits, and negotiations regarding 
manufacturer indemnification caused substantial delays.216 In one instance, GSK 
required indemnity from the Japanese government, which the government, in turn, 
replied it could not provide without a change in its law.217 Manufacturers expressed 
similar concerns with respect to Ebola vaccines in 2014.218 
C. Principles of Fairness and Justice Require Compensation for Those Suffering from 
Severe Adverse Events Following Immunization with COVID-19 Vaccines 
Globally, “there are three approaches to addressing vaccine injury: patients 
with adverse events may bear the costs associated with their injuries; they may seek 
compensation through litigation against private-sector actors (principally 
manufacturers); or they may seek compensation from publicly supported systems 
that draw from public-sector and private-sector contributions.”219 Each type of 
approach is supported by an ethical rationale. The first approach is an “extreme 
utilitarian version of the fundamental social contract supporting immunization.”220 
 
212.  See Halabi et al., supra note 148, at e125(2).  
213. Burger & Aripaka, supra note 20. 
214. Halabi & Monahan, supra note 52, at 136. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. See Yoko Nishikawa, Japan to Buy H1N1 Flu Vaccine from Glaxo, Novartis, REUTERS 
(Oct. 6, 2009, 5:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-flu-japan/japan-to-buy-h1n1-flu-
vaccine-from-glaxo-novartis-idUSTRE5953AJ20091006 [https://perma.cc/3VYS-T78M] (noting that 
the Japanese government submitted a bill to parliament to compensate patients who suffer side effects). 
218. Ben Hirschler & Stephanie Nebehay, Drugmakers May Need Indemnity for Fast-Tracked 
Ebola Vaccines, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
ebola-vaccine-idUSKCN0IC0TZ20141023 [https://perma.cc/NA2T-3YZY]. 
219. Halabi & Omer, supra note 26. 
220. Id. 
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“From the claimant’s perspective, litigation is adversarial, protracted, uncertain, and 
requires that an attorney agree to take the case, which may pose a considerable 
obstacle for claimants with low earnings or fairly minor injuries.”221 It effectively 
pushes the costs of herd immunity onto innocent parties.222 In this utilitarian view, 
the benefits of vaccination so outweigh the risks that communities accept that some 
individuals will experience adverse events in return for herd immunity.223 
“The second approach, requiring manufacturers to pay, is based on the 
integrity and dignity of the individual person—those whose products cause injury 
should make whole those individuals who experienced an adverse event.”224 
“Vaccine manufacturers dislike tort because of the uncertainty involved in allowing 
juries to determine injury causation and damages awards. Even if catastrophically 
large awards rarely occur, the threat of them weighs heavily on manufacturers and 
their insurers.”225 These two approaches are commonly applied worldwide, yet they 
“destabilize the effort to promote immunization by failing fundamental tests for 
fairness” by (1) requiring people with few resources to pay for serious (if rare) 
injuries and (2) introducing economic uncertainty.226 
The third approach, a no-fault compensation system for adverse events 
attributed to vaccination, balances these competing principles. Under a  
no-fault vaccine injury compensation system, governments compensate 
individuals who are harmed by properly manufactured vaccines instead of 
requiring them to use legal or other processes against manufacturers. A  
no-fault system acknowledges that a community that promotes 
immunization, knowing individuals will be injured, must share the burden 
of the cost of injuries. This approach also acknowledges that 
manufacturers are a critical part of vaccine access and that they must have 
a basic level of economic certainty. It fulfills the utilitarian and 
communitarian expectations of a democratic society.227 
Over time, no-fault vaccine injury compensation systems have become a 
cornerstone of advanced public health systems, first in wealthier countries, but 
 
221. Michelle M. Mello, Rationalizing Vaccine Injury Compensation, 22 BIOETHICS 32,  
33 (2008). 
222. Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1392–93 (2017) 
(analyzing community perceptions of mandated vaccines). 
223. Id. 
224. Halabi & Omer, supra note 26; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1  
(AM. L. INST. 1998) (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who 
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the defect.”); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC  
ANALYSIS (1970). 
225. Mello, supra note 221. 
226. Halabi & Omer, supra note 26; Adrien Katherine Wing, Conceptualizing Global Substantive 
Justice in the Age of Obama, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 705, 712 (2010) (“Justice issues transcend 
borders. We are beyond the time when we can segregate national and international issues.”). 
227. Halabi & Omer, supra note 3. Cf. Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 574 (2020) (“No-fault insurance, which works a partial preemption of tort suits, 
adds an additional layer of subsidy for driving via torts.”). 
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increasingly in low- and lower-middle-income countries such as Nepal and 
Vietnam.228 The first such system was adopted in Germany in 1961 and has 
expanded to thirty-nine countries as well as the Canadian province of Quebec.229 
III. SOLVING THE COVID-19 VACCINE PRODUCT LIABILITY PROBLEM 
So far, solutions to the vaccine product liability problem have been achieved 
only by a small number of wealthy countries and a handful of middle-income 
countries. Those solutions follow one of two approaches. First, the domestic law of 
the procuring government provides separately for legal immunity to manufacturers 
and a compensation system for those suffering side effects. Second, governments 
and manufacturers agree through contract on the division of liabilities between 
them, with presumptive recourse to litigation for those suffering severe vaccine side 
effects. The first approach is adopted by the United States under its PREP Act, 
detailed below. The second approach has been adopted by the EU, which has 
offered varying levels of liability protection to AstraZeneca and Sanofi based on 
price per dose of vaccine.230 
But the need to compensate those suffering severe side effects following 
immunization is worldwide, especially through COVAX, as is the need to provide 
manufacturers legal certainty regarding their participation. This Part provides 
solutions for the rest of the world by combining together three  
approaches: requiring existing national no-fault systems to incorporate injuries 
attributable to COVID-19 vaccines distributed through COVAX, leveraging an 
existing small-scale insurance regime administered by the WHO, and constructing 
a system for no-fault vaccine injury compensation using mass claims models 
deployed after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the 
compensation systems used after the Boeing 737 mass casualty airplane  
crash events. 
A. No-Fault Compensation for Vaccine Injury 
1. No-Fault Compensation Systems for Public Health Emergencies 
Some jurisdictions, like the United States, have extended immunity against 
legal claims related to the manufacturing, testing, development, distribution, and 
 
228. Randy G. Mungwira, Christine Guillard, Adiela Saldaña, Nobuhiko Okabe, Helen 
Petousis-Harris, Edinam Agbenu, Lance Rodewald & Patrick L. F. Zuber, Global Landscape Analysis 
of No-fault Compensation Programmes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of Implementing 
Countries, PLOS ONE, May 21, 2020, at 5; see Josephine Gittler, Controlling Resurgent  
Tuberculosis: Public Health Agencies, Public Policy, and Law, 19 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L. 107,  
139–40 (1994) (analyzing public health measures as part of broader social safety planning). 
229. Looker & Kelly, supra note 117, at 371–72. 
230. Francesco Guarascio, Exclusive: AstraZeneca Gets Partial Immunity in Low-cost EU 
Vaccine Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2020, 11:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-
coronavirus-eu-astrazeneca/exclusive-astrazeneca-gets-partial-immunity-in-low-cost-eu-vaccine-deal-i 
dUSL5N2GK3NE [https://perma.cc/3BSW-2AMP]. 
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administration of COVID-19 vaccines.231 The law provides for a publicly funded 
and administered program of compensation for those suffering severe side effects. 
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act was enacted on 
December 30, 2005.232 The purpose of the Act is to encourage companies to 
promptly release medical countermeasures during public health emergencies.233 The 
PREP Act precludes liability for defects in diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines 
under both federal and state law for any loss “caused by, arising out of, or resulting 
from” the application of a “covered countermeasure.”234 PREP Act declarations 
have been made for H1N1, Ebola, botulism toxin, anthrax, smallpox, and acute 
radiation syndrome.235 
For COVID-19, a “covered countermeasure” is any antiviral, any other drug, 
any biologic, any diagnostic, any other device, any respiratory protective device, or 
any vaccine, used (a) to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent, mitigate or limit the harm 
from COVID-19, or the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating 
therefrom, or (b) to limit the harm that COVID-19, or the transmission of  
SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom, might otherwise cause. A “covered 
countermeasure” is also any device used in the administration of any such product 
and all components and constituent materials of any such product that has been 
authorized pursuant to a declaration by the Secretary of U.S. Health and Human 
 
231. See generally Looker & Kelly, supra note 117. 
232. Notice of Amendment and Republished Declaration Under the Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19 and Republication of 
the Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 79190, 79191 (Dec. 9, 2020). 
233. KEVIN, J. HICKEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10443, THE PREP ACT AND  
COVID-19: LIMITING LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 1 (2021), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10443 [http://web.archive.org/web/202109280050 
52/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10443 ]. 
234. Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical 
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15198, 15200 (Mar. 17, 2020). 
235. Ebola Virus Disease Vaccines, 79 Fed. Reg. 73314 (Dec. 10, 2014); HHS Secretary’s 
Declaration for Utilization of Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Botulism 
Countermeasures, 73 Fed. Reg. 61864 (Oct. 17, 2008); HHS Secretary’s Declaration for Utilization of 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Anthrax Countermeasures, 73 Fed. Reg. 58239 
(Oct. 6, 2008); HHS Secretary’s Declaration for Utilization of Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness Act for Smallpox Countermeasures, 73 Fed. Reg. 61869 (Oct. 17, 2008); Letter from Brian 
L. Strom, Kristine M. Gebbie, Robert B. Wallace & Committee on Smallpox Vaccination Program 
Implementation to Dr. Julie Gerberding ( Jan. 16, 2003), in THE SMALLPOX VACCINATION  
PROGRAM: PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 123, 123–159 (Alina Baciu, Andrea Pernack 
Anason, Kathleen Stratton & Brian Strom eds., 2005); HHS Secretary’s Declaration for Utilization of 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Acute Radiation Syndrome, 73 Fed. Reg. 61866 
(Oct. 17, 2008); David W. Ogden, Bruce S. Manheim Jr., Sean Hayes & Ariel Dobkin,  
COVID-19: Immunity Under the PREP Act: When Does It Apply to Private Sector Efforts to Help 
Combat COVID-19?, WILMERHALE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/
client-alerts/20200330-immunity-under-the-prep-act-when-does-it-apply-to-private-sector-efforts-to-
help-combat-covid19 [https://perma.cc/C3SL-ZGJ8]. 
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Services (HHS).236 The HHS Secretary, Alex Azar, issued the initial PREP Act 
declaration covering COVID-19 vaccines on March 10, 2020.237 In order to qualify 
for PREP Act immunity, a covered countermeasure, including a COVID-19 
vaccine, must be approved by the U.S. FDA, either pursuant to conventional 
licensure or under an EUA.238 Manufacturers and distributors are immune from 
liability regardless of the geographical area where the countermeasure was 
administered or used.239 
As part of the same law limiting manufacturer liabilities for covered 
countermeasures, the United States provides for a system of compensation for 
those suffering severe side effects. The Countermeasures Injury Compensation 
Program (CICP) was created by the PREP Act.240 Should an individual experience 
an injury as a result of the use of a covered countermeasure, he or she is allowed to 
submit a claim to the Health Resource and Services Administration (an agency 
within the HSS). A claimant must complete a Request for Benefits form and submit 
medical evidence within a year of being administered or using the 
countermeasure.241 Once a claim has been submitted, it is reviewed by medical staff 
within the program to determine a causal link. 
If HHS has published an injury table for the covered countermeasure, the 
claimant is entitled to a presumption of causation. If not, the claimant must prove 
causation through “compelling” evidence.242 Once causation is established, 
claimants are compensated.243 There is no adversarial process or presentation of 
further evidence to a court or special tribunal.244 The CICP has received 485 claims 
since it began accepting claims related to H1N1 vaccines in 2010.245 Of those claims, 
 
236. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1) (2020); ROBERT P. CHARROW, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH  
& HUM. SERVS., ADVISORY OPINION ON THE PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
ACT AND THE MARCH 10, 2020 DECLARATION UNDER THE ACT (May 19, 2020). 
237.  HICKEY, supra note 233, at 2. 
238. Ogden et al., supra note 235. 
239. Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for 
Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15198, 15201 (Mar. 17, 2020). 
240. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2020). 
241. Filing for Benefits, HRSA, https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/filing-benefits [https:// 
perma.cc/4FCK-2ZFQ] ( last visited Apr. 2020). 
242. Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 835 (2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 239a(c)(2), 247d-6e(b)(4)) (“[C]ompelling, reliable, 
valid, medical and scientific evidence.”). 
243. See Robert Roos, HHS: 386 Injury Claims Filed Over H1N1 Countermeasures, CIDRAP 
(Mar. 16, 2011), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2011/03/hhs-386-injury-claims-
filed-over-h1n1-countermeasures [https://perma.cc/29LU-HWCN]; Mungwira et al., supra note 228, 
at 9. 
244. See HRSA, supra note 241. 
245. Tom Hals, COVID-19 Era Highlights U.S. ‘Black Hole’ Compensation Fund for Pandemic 
Vaccine Injuries, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2020, 4:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-vaccines-liability/covid-19-era-highlights-u-s-black-hole-compensation-fund-for-pandemic 
-vaccine-injuries-idUSKBN25H1E8 [https://perma.cc/HFC6-Z8QE]. 
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thirty-nine individuals have received compensation with a total $5.7 million paid.246 
Of the 485 claims filed with the CICP, 386 were related to the H1N1 vaccine.247 
The United States is the only country in the world with such an extensive 
system for covering manufacturers of emergency deployed vaccines and providing 
for ex post compensation.248 
2. Adapting No-Fault Compensation Systems for Routine Immunizations 
Similar no-fault systems for routine immunization existed before COVID-19 
for twenty-five countries (including the United States) and the province of Quebec 
in Canada.249 Fourteen additional countries have adopted such systems pursuant to 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The first prong of solving the COVID-19 vaccine 
product liability problem requires that countries with established no-fault systems 
agree to incorporate COVID-19 vaccines into their no-fault systems if they receive 
vaccines through the COVAX Facility.250 All of these systems provide a schedule 
of automatic compensation based on the injury without establishing fault. None of 
these systems require the vaccine recipient to prove the maker of the vaccine  
was negligent.251 
There are variations in how the programs are funded, who is eligible, who 
administers the program, and what limits exist on collection for the claimant should 
they be successful. Any one of the given models may be incorporated into a global 
system run by the COVAX Facility, but for those countries with pre-existing 
systems, the most straightforward approach is to require those countries to affirm 
that COVID-19 vaccines with a table of compensable injuries generated from Phase 
III trials and ongoing monitoring and experience will be incorporated into  
their systems. 
a. Funding 
In most countries with no-fault systems, the government stands in as the 
defendant, and as a result, most programs are government-funded.252 Fifteen 
 
246. Id.  
247. See Roos, supra note 243. 
248. NICHOLAS M. PACE & LLOYD DIXON, RAND CORP., COVID-19  
VACCINATIONS: LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION CONSIDERATIONS CRITICAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL 
CAMPAIGN 6 (2020), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA700/ 
PEA761-1/RAND_PEA761-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FJ2-JZ4F] (“Although some countries have 
legal processes through which vaccine-injury claims can be addressed outside traditional litigation, few 
countries provide any level of immunity to entities and individuals within the supply chain that 
compares with the sweeping protections available under PREP.”). 
249. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 1, 4–5. 
250. See id. at 9; INST. OF MED., Liability for the Production and Sale of Vaccines, in VACCINE 
SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 85, 85 (1985) (“Manufacturers have complained about the costs, the 
unpredictability of the law, and the unavailability and cost of insurance.”). 
251. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 8. 
252. JENNIFER KEELAN & KUMANAN WILSON, DESIGNING A NO-FAULT VACCINE-INJURY 
COMPENSATION PROGRAMME FOR CANADA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN INTERNATIONAL 
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current systems are funded by their governments, while eight fund themselves from 
other sources, including levies on manufacturers.253 
For example, France, Denmark, Quebec, and Italy all use general tax revenues 
to pay damage awards to injured parties.254 In Sweden, Taiwan, and Norway, 
manufacturers pay a premium to fund the no-fault program.255 While administered 
at the government level, Norway’s program is actually funded by a special insurance 
organization called the Drug Liability Association.256 Membership in this 
association is mandatory for any drug producer in Norway.257 Members pay for an 
insurance regime that is used to fund the no-fault program.258 
The United States collects a $0.75 levy on each dose (so MMR, for example, 
would be $2.25) of the vaccine sold, then funds the no-fault program with the 
levy.259 The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program trust holds approximately three 
billion dollars from this levy with about $150 million being deposited every year. 260 
b. Eligibility 
With respect to eligibility, fifty-seven percent of no-fault systems compensate 
injuries for those vaccines which are registered and recommended by their 
respective governments.261 This is the broadest category of vaccines, encompassing 
any vaccine the government (through public health agencies) may recommend. 
However, a minority of programs (twenty-two percent) only cover those vaccines 
that are mandated or recommended through law.262 The U.K. and Quebec both 
only cover vaccines which are specifically listed in the legislation establishing the 
no-fault program.263 Eligibility provisions of national regimes would require 
amendment for COVID-19 vaccines in some cases.264 
All no-fault programs maintain at least some threshold of injury for 
compensation.265 Quebec allows for any serious injury, for example, while the  
 
ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMMES 2, 10 (2011), https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/Keelan-Wilson_NoFaultVaccine_CPHS_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CJ4H-2MHV]. 
253. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 6, 10. 
254. Id. at 5–6. 
255. KEELAN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 3. 
256. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 6. 
257. LEGEMIDDELANSVARSFORENINGEN, LIABILITY INSURANCE IN CONNECTION WITH 
CLINICAL TRIALS OF DRUGS 1 (2019), http://www.laf.no/dm_documents/8366497_1_Liability_ 
insurance_in_connection_with_clinical_trials_of_drugs_QPgvg.PDF [https://perma.cc/8ALU-KUYV]. 
258. Id. at 1–2. 
259. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 6. 
260. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1660, 1713 (2015). 
261. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 6. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See id. 
265. Id. at 7. 
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U.K. offers compensation if the vaccine is solely responsible for causing sixty 
percent or more disability in an individual.266 
All current programs also require some sort of causal link to be established 
between the injury and the vaccine.267 Generally, no-fault systems require a  
balance-of-probabilities test that, in the United States, is understood as “more likely 
than not” or through a “preponderance of the evidence” analysis.268 
c. Administration 
Most (sixty-five percent) of current no-fault programs are administered at the 
national government level through public bureaucracies.269 Few programs, such as 
China and Switzerland, administer their programs at the provincial level.270 
Finland and Sweden both administer their no-fault programs through a private 
drug insurance scheme. Sweden’s drug companies have private insurance to which 
they pay premiums. Those premiums are then used to fund a program, with injured 
parties filing claims with insurers.271 
d. Limits on Compensation 
Systems vary with respect to those damages qualifying for compensation. 
Some programs include medical costs, lost earnings, pain and suffering 
compensation, emotional distress, and even loss of earning capacity.272 Quebec, for 
example, refers to an automobile insurance act in setting claimant compensation 
and pays claimants the same as automobile accident victims.273 
In the U.K., compensation is set at £120,000.274 This amount reflects the 
lifelong support those on disability already receive from the British government, 
while also attempting to “ease the burden of affected families.”275 
 
266. KEELAN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 10. 
267. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 8. 
268. Id. 
269. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 5. 
270. Id. at 6. In 2014, China required all thirty-one provinces to implement the compensation 
programme for vaccine injuries. Administration of the programme involves all levels of  
government: “filing of claims and causality assessment of events is done at district or county level; 
operational procedures for compensation are set at province level and general vaccine injury 
compensation policies including definitions of what constitutes a vaccine injury are determined at the 
central government level.” Id. The programme was enacted by the central government but is actually 
run by local governments. Each province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central 
Chinese government needs to formulate its specific local regulations for compensation for AEFI. 
Lanfang Fei & Zhou Peng, No-Fault Compensation for Adverse Events Following Immunization: A Review 
of Chinese Law and Practice, 25 MED. L. REV. 99, 103–04 (2017). 
271. KEELAN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 2, 10. 
272. Mungwira et al., supra note 228, at 8. 
273. Id. 
274. KEELAN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 18. 
275. Id. 
Clean Final Edit_Halabi_V3.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:15 AM 
154 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:111 
B. Expanding Small-Scale Insurance Plans 
While thirty-nine countries, including Nepal, the Philippines, and Vietnam, 
maintain no-fault vaccine injury compensation systems that could be used for 
COVID-19 vaccines, the vast majority of countries do not. The second prong of a 
comprehensive solution to the vaccine injury product liability problem is the use of 
small-scale insurance regimes that exist under the auspices of the WHO that may 
be expanded in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The WHO maintains a small-scale insurance regime for EUA vaccines that it 
procures and distributes. The plan for a no-fault insurance regime followed the 
2014–2016 West Africa Ebola public health emergency. While there was a leading 
vaccine candidate—rVSV-ZEBOV, now marketed as Ervebo—that had been 
developed over a fifteen-year period before the outbreak, there was no system for 
addressing liability and compensation if it were to be deployed on an emergency use 
basis.276 One of the most afflicted countries refused to accept responsibility for 
product liability claims, and the manufacturer limited its participation to the 
sponsorship of clinical trials organized after the peak of the epidemic had passed.277 
Given the uncertainty about permanent licensure, the WHO sought an 
insurance product that would apply after the clinical trial stage—where insurance is 
relatively easy to obtain and inexpensive—and full licensure—when manufacturers 
are expected to assume liability for their products.278 
 
276. Ann Maria Henao-Restrepo, Marie-Pierre Preziosi, David Wood, Vasee Moorthy Marie 
Paule Kieny & the WHO Ebola Research, Development Team, On a Path to Accelerate Access to Ebola 
Vaccines: The WHO’s Research and Development Efforts During the 2014–2016 Ebola Epidemic in West 
Africa, CURRENT OP. VIROLOGY, Apr. 2016, at 138, 140–41, https://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
science/article/pii/S1879625716300384 (click “View PDF”) [https://perma.cc/22BT-TT9X]. 
277. See Sam Halabi, Andrew Heinrich & Saad B. Omer, No-Fault Compensation for Vaccine 
Injury—The Other Side of Equitable Access to Covid-19 Vaccines, 383 New England Journal of Medicine 
23 (2020).  
278. World Health Org. [WHO], Workshop on Expanded Access to Experimental Ebola Vaccines 
During Outbreaks, at 21–22 (2017) [hereinafter WHO, Experimental Ebola Vaccines ] 
https://www.who.int/blueprint/expanded-access-ebola-vaccines.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X8W-
4MBR] (“The ultimate objective of this special insurance product is to facilitate emergency response 
action and timely deployment of experimental vaccines in the event of infectious disease outbreaks for 
which no licensed vaccine exists. While manufacturers of experimental vaccines will be required to 
assume liability arising from failure to manufacture their product in accordance with current Good 
Manufacturing Practices and agreed specifications, recipient countries will (as was the case during the 
2014–2016 Ebola outbreak) as a condition for receiving experimental vaccine be required to assume 
liability and indemnify WHO, donors and manufacturers for other risks arising out of the use of the 
product. At the same time, WHO would obtain insurance coverage for the benefit of recipient 
countries, to provide compensation to individuals who suffer from serious AEFI. The insurance would 
have two levels: (i) a first level based on an annual premium, to keep the insurance open over time; and 
(ii) a second level of insurance to be obtained when an outbreak occurs, with a premium based on 
agreed criteria (vaccine safety profile, Gross Domestic Product of the country where the experimental 
product would be used and the number of people that would receive the product). The insurance could 
also include a certain coverage for manufacturers, i.e. in case an individual refuses to accept the 
compensation offered under the insurance and wishes to pursue a liability claim against the 
manufacturer in a court of law (or any similar forum).”). 
Clean Final Edit_Halabi_V3.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:15 AM 
2021] PANDEMIC VACCINE PRODUCT LIABILITY 155 
The WHO scheme insures against serious injuries resulting from experimental 
vaccines that the WHO administers on an emergency use basis.279 The WHO must 
declare an Emergency Use Assessment Listing for vaccines that are still 
experimental or have not been completely clinically verified in emergency 
situations.280 Granting such an assessment listing expedites immunization response 
during disease outbreaks for which no licensed vaccine currently exists. However, 
risks naturally occur alongside such an assessment listing, as the vaccine is still 
relatively untested and can present unknown dangers when deployed widely to all 
types of people with varying health conditions.281 So, the WHO provides, through 
a private insurer, compensation and protection for those countries receiving and 
using an experimental vaccine, as well as legal protection as an incentive to 
manufacturers to donate needed immunizations.282 
This insurance is procured through both an annual premium and a heightened 
cost in the event of an outbreak. The premium during an outbreak is based on 
criteria such as the GDP of the country where the vaccine is being deployed. This 
insurance compensates for immunization-caused injuries within the country in 
which they occur.283 While manufacturers of experimental vaccines are required to 
assume liability arising from failure to manufacture their product in accordance with 
current good manufacturing practices and agreed specifications, recipient countries, 
as a condition for receiving the experimental vaccine, must assume liability and 
indemnify the WHO, donors, and manufacturers for other risks arising out of the 
use of the product in order to receive the benefits of the insurance policy.284 The 
insurance also includes contingent coverage for manufacturers, “i.e. in case an 
individual refuses to accept the compensation offered under the insurance and 
wishes to pursue a liability claim against the manufacturer in a court of law (or any 
similar forum).”285 
The biggest limitation in this plan is its scope. The current plan only grants 
coverage to countries for a specific vaccine when the WHO specifically brands the 
vaccine as emergency use and then distributes it. Although the WHO has expanded 
its current mechanism for COVID-19 in partnership with ESIS, Inc., a unit of 
Chubb Insurance, it has also made clear that “dozens of middle-income countries, 
such as South Africa, Lebanon, Gabon, Iran and most Latin American states, [will] 
not be offered this protection.”286 Yet there are large insurers who may be able to 
 
279. Id. 
280. Regulation and Prequalification: Emergency Use Listing, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://
www.who.int/teams/regulation-prequalification/eul [https://perma.cc/CD3W-DHT6] ( last visited 
July 13, 2021 ). 
281. WHO, Experimental Ebola Vaccines, supra note 278. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 21. 
285. Id. at 22. 
286. Francesco Guarascio, WHO to Form COVID Insurance Scheme for Vaccine Side-Effects in 
Poor Nations, INS. J. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/
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scale up the WHO system for COVID-19 vaccines including Allianz Multinational, 
Chubb, Swiss Re, and Zurich Multinational.287 In 2011, Swiss Re opened its 
subsidiary, Corporate Solutions, whose focus is on underwriting risk for medium 
and large corporations.288 The Corporate Solutions arm of the company offers 
coverage in about 150 countries.289 
C. Centralized Mass Claims Administration 
There are currently no-fault vaccine injury compensation programs across 
twenty-five of the 217 countries currently listed by the World Bank.290 The  
twenty-five countries with compensation programs include a handful of large 
countries (including the United States and China), but the 192 countries without any 
form of compensation programs encompass about sixty-six percent of the human 
population.291 There are currently 5.03 billion people living without a no-fault 
compensation program for their vaccine injuries.292 As noted above, the WHO 
insurance regime is small in scale, perhaps at this point only able to cover  
one-to-five million individuals. 
There is, therefore, a need to provide a mechanism through the COVAX 
Facility or a system of country opt-outs that satisfies manufacturer demands for 
indemnity or immunity from legal claims. The models below may serve as effective 
options for running a no-fault compensation system out of the COVAX Facility. 
As with the no-fault systems described above, funding for a centrally administered 
system could be from funds already earmarked for COVAX purposes or a $0.05 or 
$0.10 levy per dose. Given the billions of doses to be administered, even a small 
levy would quickly generate a pool of resources for compensation. 
1. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon, an 
offshore oil drilling rig owned by Transocean Ltd. [BP’s offshore drilling 
 
10/29/588706.htm [https://perma.cc/SSB7-EQUR]. See also covaxclaims.com [https:// 
perma.cc/G8AK-8XBY] for the specifics of the expanded WHO system. 
287. See, e.g., About Us, SWISS RE CORP. SOLS., https://corporatesolutions.swissre.com/about-
us.html [https://perma.cc/5CM6-K23M] ( last visited July 13, 2021); Brian Till, How Drug Companies 
Keep Medicine Out of Reach, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2013/05/how-drug-companies-keep-medicine-out-of-reach/275853/ [https://perma.cc/CV8F-9K6S]. 
288. SWISS RE, 2011 BUSINESS REPORT 13 (2011), https://www.swissre.com/dam/
jcr:1651ad7b-3bff-457b-a59a-b1756611c7f9/2011_AR_business_report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BCA9-YF8Q]. 
289. International Programs, SWISS RE CORP. SOLS., https://corporatesolutions.swissre.com/
insurance-solutions/international-programs.html [https://perma.cc/9W54-YGKP] ( last visited July 
13, 2021). 
290. See Mungwira et al., supra note 228; Population, Total, WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/6VXG-KEE2] ( last visited July 13, 
2021). 
291. Id. 
292. See id. 
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contractor], which resulted in, among other things, the deaths of eleven 
crewmen and the discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico for several 
months. The Spill dwarfed the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (which gave rise 
to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990) both in terms of the amount of oil 
discharged and the extent of the impact.293 
The resulting legal claims were massive in number and scope but were 
effectively limited by claims processes required under U.S. law. Under the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), BP (lessor of the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
platform) was designated the responsible party for the spill by the United States 
Coast Guard.294 Under the OPA, responsible parties must construct a claims 
process against themselves for all affected by the spill. The United States negotiated 
with BP to create a twenty-billion-dollar trust to finance the claims resulting from 
the spill.295 As a part of these negotiations, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) 
was established.296 
The GCCF was created to process claims in a neutral and efficient manner. 
First, a claimant’s eligibility was determined through a classification analysis. 
Claimants would bring their claims under five categories: removal and cleanup 
costs, real or personal property damage, lost profits or earning capacity, subsistence 
use of natural resources, or physical injury or death.297 The GCCF only paid out 
compensation to those injuries proximately caused by the oil spill.298 Once a 
claimant was determined eligible, a GCCF claims reviewer used a standardized 
calculator to determine the claimant’s losses (claimants would submit 
documentation wherever possible to substantiate their claims).299 During Phase I of 
the GCCF’s operations, it paid a minimum of $1,000, even to claimants whose 
damages totaled less.300 
The methods by which the GCCF offered compensation evolved as claimants 
continued filing. One option included a one-time payment of $5,000 alongside an 
agreement to release claims. This “Final Payment” option was rapid, as no damages 
were calculated, and little paperwork or evidence was required to be submitted.301 
The GCCF received claims from claimants from all fifty states in the United 
States and from forty countries.  
 
293. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY: REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 11 
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/06/06/gccf-rpt-find-obs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UWC3-F6MX]. 
294. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR INTERIM AND FINAL CLAIMS (2011). 
295. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 293, at 12. 
296. Id. at 12. 
297. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 294, at 2–4. 
298. Id. at 4. 
299. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 293, at 31. 
300. Id. at 32. 
301. Id. at 34. 
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The GCCF undertook several steps . . . to meet the language needs of 
claimants. These included, but were not limited to, staffing of the  
GCG-operated call center with persons fluent in Spanish, Vietnamese and 
French and creation of a process by which a telephone translation service 
would be used for callers who spoke other languages; staffing of certain 
site offices with people who were fluent in Spanish, Vietnamese, Laotian, 
Khmer, French and Croatian; making all claim forms available in hardcopy 
in Spanish, Vietnamese and Khmer; posting all website content in Spanish, 
Vietnamese and Khmer; sending all correspondence that did not require 
the inclusion of claimant specific claims information in Spanish, 
Vietnamese or Khmer for all claimants who had notified the GCCF of a 
preference for one of these languages; providing claimants with an 
opportunity for a special appointment with a translator present; and 
creating an online claims filing process, accessible through the GCCF 
website, through which claimants could file claims in Spanish  
and Vietnamese.302 
During its eighteen-month existence, the GCCF paid over six billion dollars 
to more than 200 thousand individual and business claimants.303 
It is important to acknowledge that what was true of the GCCF will be true of 
any system established through the COVAX Facility. The primary concern 
regarding the GCCF was error. Upon an independent investigation of the program 
by an outside party at the request of the Department of Justice, it was determined 
about 10,000 claimants were either negatively affected by error or erroneously 
denied compensation.304 In a broader context, this represented about a five percent 
error rate. 
The program implemented by the GCCF was designed by policy and activated 
upon a disaster. But there are themes and design elements that are applicable to a 
global immunization context. The idea of a centralized claims facility for every 
person injured by one vaccine would be much simpler than the current system of 
relying on governments to establish their own systems and potentially resulting in 
inconsistent judgments against the manufacturer or similar claimants. A centralized 
system is also efficient. Instead of 192 separate systems, each independently staffed, 
one program for the globe would require fewer resources. 
A centralized compensation program, financed through international 
donations and a relatively modest $0.05 or $0.10 per dose levy, administered by a 
third party, and adjudicating claims in a standardized manner would offer rapid 
compensation to those harmed as well as confidence for manufacturers.305 
Globalizing the system, instead of programs in a select few countries, would also 
 
302. Id. at 33. 
303. Id. at 59. 
304. Id. at 67, 70. 
305. Vaccine Injury Financial Assistance Programme for COVID-19 Vaccination, SING. 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.moh.gov.sg/covid-19/vaccination/vifap 
[https://perma.cc/Z27K-CQWD]. 
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enable manufacturers to distribute vaccines to countries where litigation risk is not 
effectively calculable. 
2. Boeing 737 Max Crash Compensation System 
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight 610 crashed, killing every person on 
board and resulting in 189 deaths.306 Five months later, on March 10, 2019, 
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed, killing all 157 people on board.307 In both 
catastrophes, the plane that crashed was a Boeing 737 Max, a new and popular 
model.308 Investigations into both crashes, which followed similar stories of 
crashing after failing to gain altitude after takeoff, indicated a defect in the plane 
which caused the accidents.309 Boeing was held liable for the deaths of 346 people, 
and the Boeing Max was grounded until the defect was cured and a fix was approved 
by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.310 The nationalities of the victims from 
the two crashes spanned thirty-five different countries, from the United States to 
Kenya to China.311 
International aviation accidents are governed by the Montreal Convention. 
This international treaty determines which country’s courts may hear lawsuits 
regarding the accident and how much the families of victims may be 
compensated.312 Airline accidents such as the 737 Max crashes are relevant to the 
construction of a compensation system for vaccine injuries in that what caused the 
harm is not relevant. When a plane crashes and all lives on board are lost, there is a 
presumption of a causal relationship. 
 
306. Scott Neuman, Indonesia Report: Pilots, Ground Crew Share Blame with Boeing for Lion Air 
Crash, NPR (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/773291951/pilots-ground-
crew-share-blame-for-lion-air-737-max-crash-indonesian-report-says [https://perma.cc/DM89-JSMX]. 
307. Hadra Ahmed, Norimitsu Onishi, Dionne Searcey & Hannah Beech, Ethiopian Airlines 
Plane Is the 2nd Boeing Max 8 to Crash in Months, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/world/africa/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash.html [https:// 
perma.cc/S9V2-T3PS]. 
308. Avie Schneider, Boeing 737 Max, Involved in 2 Crashes, Is Fastest-Selling Plane in 
Company’s History, NPR (Mar. 11, 2019, 1:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/11/702211493/
boeing-737-max-involved-in-two-crashes-is-fastest-selling-plane-in-companys-hist [https://perma.cc/ 
VM6Q-GJWS]. 
309. Lion Air JT610 Crash: What the Preliminary Report Tells Us, BBC (Nov. 28, 2018), https:/
/www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46373125 [https://perma.cc/YD4L-MP2R]. 
310. David Slotnick, The First Boeing 737 Max Crash Was 2 Years Ago Today. Here’s the 
Complete History of the Plane That’s Been Grounded Since 2 Crashes Killed 346 People 5 Months Apart, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-
timeline-history-full-details-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/V25M-5JKD]. 
311. Press Release, Ethiopian Airlines, Accident Bulletin Number 3 (Mar. 10, 2019), https://
corporate.ethiopianairlines.com/Press-release-open-page/accident-bulletin-no.-3-issued-on-march-10 
-2019-at-4-59-pm [https://perma.cc/Y3HK-37P5]; see also Sinéad Baker, What We Know About the 
Victims of the Lion Air Plane Crash Off Indonesia, Where There Were ‘likely no survivors’, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 31, 2018, 7:24 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/lion-air-plane-crash-victims-indonesia-
2018-10?r=UK [https://perma.cc/F3XJ-D3UY]. 
312. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, ch. 3, 
May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,038 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. 
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Under the Montreal Convention, a carrier is liable for up to 100,000 Special 
Drawing Rights (a weighted basket of currencies generated by the International 
Monetary Fund with implications for a broad range of international organizations 
and private parties) or about $140,000. The convention applies to carriers, not 
manufacturers.313 However, if compensation exceeds this amount, a claimant may 
recover if they are able to prove another party is at fault and the carrier is not 
responsible. This is the only element of causation open to dispute—compensation 
above the limit. Even this element is relatively straightforward. In the 737 Max 
context, several aviation authorities investigated the crashes to determine fault and 
decided definitively that the 737 Max had a design flaw in its sensors.314 
Both Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Airlines paid out their initial compensations 
pursuant to the Montreal Convention. The airlines compensated the victims 
through their insurance carriers. Their insurers then recovered from Boeing after 
the evidence clearly indicated the fault was with the design of the plane.315 Boeing 
is insured in multiple layers, with both self-insurance then a stop-loss policy with 
the British insurer Global Aerospace.316 Claimants then came to Boeing to recover 
the rest needed to adequately compensate them for the loss of their family members. 
In September 2019, Boeing announced the creation of a fund designed to 
compensate families. The fund was capitalized to around fifty million dollars, and 
each passenger’s family was paid $144,500.317 Accepting payment did not foreclose 
any litigation rights for the victims.318 In the Lion Air Crash (189 fatalities), 150 
claims were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 
Chicago. Boeing recently announced they settled 171 claims out of the 189 people 
on board, including 140 of those claims filed in the Northern District of Illinois.319 
 
313. How the Montreal Convention Works in Air Crashes, BAUM HEADLUND ARISTEI  
& GOLDMAN, https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/aviation-accident/montreal-convention-air-
crashes/ [https://perma.cc/QRY5-JDQL] ( last visited July 19, 2021). 
314. Ainur Rohmah, Ian Duncan, Michael Laris & Shibani Mahtani, Lion Air Crash 
Investigators Fault Boeing 737 Max’s Flight-Control System, Regulatory Lapses and Pilot Training, WASH. 




315. Noor Zainab Hussain, Carolyn Cohn & Suzanne Barlyn, Insurers Face Large Claims After 




317. David Shepardson, Boeing to Pay 737 Max Victim’s Families $144,500 Each, REUTERS 
(Sept. 23, 2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-victims/boeing-to-
pay-737-max-crash-victims-families-144500-each-idUSKBN1W8288 [https://perma.cc/RE8G-T6BU]. 
318. Id. 
319. Eric M. Johnson, Boeing Settles Nearly All Lion Air 737 MAX Crash Claims; Filing, 
REUTERS ( July 7, 2020, 4:29 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-settlement/
boeing-settles-nearly-all-lion-air-737-max-crash-claims-filing-idUSKBN24838P [https://perma.cc/ 
NB2A-M3T9]. 
Clean Final Edit_Halabi_V3.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:15 AM 
2021] PANDEMIC VACCINE PRODUCT LIABILITY 161 
Boeing did not publicize payment amounts, but reports suggest approximately $1.2 
million per claim.320 
Under the system organized by Boeing, claimants who were unable to afford 
litigation either in the United States or in their home countries were able to receive 
compensation. The system also managed Boeing’s liability and expected losses. 
CONCLUSION 
Tremendous strides have been made toward assuring equitable access to 
COVID-19 vaccines for low- and lower-middle-income countries. But affordability 
ex ante is not enough. Manufacturers will not ship vaccines to countries where 
liability looms, and the populations in those countries that are unable or unwilling 
to promise indemnity should not go without vaccines and, if they receive them, 
should not be left to subsidize herd immunity enjoyed by the world’s uninjured. 
This Article has endeavored to address the liability barrier through analysis of 
existing and proposed mechanisms including current no-fault systems, the 
expansion of current insurance regimes, and the establishment of a centralized  
no-fault system centered at the COVAX Facility.321 Doing so would address the 
pandemic threat, ensure that those suffering rare adverse events are not left to 
shoulder the costs associated with the massive benefits accrued by everyone else, 





















321. See Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in 
International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473 (2011). 
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